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Preface 
If the adage that “college teaches you how to think, not what to think” holds true, one 
would be hard-pressed to find a better test of this principle than the study of anti-racist 
advocacy groups. So much about the discussion of these advocacy groups and the alleged 
“hate groups” they purport to fight is heavily emotion- and value-laden, even within 
academia, where dispassionate objectivity in research is supposed to reign supreme. The 
result is that much of the data produced by these advocacy groups may lead the reader to 
predetermined conclusions, usually based on primal emotional reactions, which is also 
the primary mechanism behind classic propaganda. 
 Higher education requires us utilize the intellectual methods which we have 
learned to examine evidence critically so that we may come to reasoned conclusions 
based on the facts over personal bias.   
My intent here is not to defend the words and actions of alleged “hate groups,” or 
at least not the content of such expression. My goal is to move beyond the emotional 
reflexivity that underlies much “hate group” research and to examine the fundamental 
structures behind it. What exactly is a “hate group”? Who are the “experts”? How 
accurate and reliable are the data produced by private advocacy groups, and how does the 
quality of those claims affect the academic research built around them? 
Because so much advocacy group data does find its way into our civic discourse, 
our academic research, and ultimately into our political debates, I feel that it is imperative 
to take a “trust, but verify” approach when examining all such claims. There are too 
many important civil rights issues at stake to simply accept the information without 
proper vetting and review. 
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Abstract 
In the 1980s, the term “hate group” began to appear increasingly in American 
media reports, often referring to the Ku Klux Klan or various neo-Nazi activities. There is 
no legal definition of the term, as it is not illegal to belong to such organizations, and so 
the designation of hate groups generally falls to private advocacy groups that claim to 
track them, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) of Montgomery, Alabama. 
When the media or academic researchers require data on hate groups, they often turn to 
advocacy groups, usually due to a lack of other sources and because of the ease of access 
to the data and to perceived experts in the field. 
 This thesis will examine the hate group data produced by the Southern Poverty 
Law Center, analyzing its accuracy and reliability by examining the SPLC’s methodology 
and claims. I will also examine the SPLC’s reputation as a trusted source of information 
by reviewing the history of the organization, its rhetorical practices, and the public 
statements of several of its key officers. As any study or academic research is only as 
valid as the accuracy of the information upon which it is based, it is essential to evaluate 
accuracy of the source of the data. 
 Many of the SPLC’s rhetorical practices can be compared with the fearmongering 
and exploitation found in classic propaganda techniques and will be analyzed further in 
this paper. Instead of serving as an unbiased clearinghouse for hate group information, 
the SPLC often pursues an ideologically-driven course that is designed to influence a 
targeted, politically progressive audience. 
 Because this unvetted data is readily accepted by the media and researchers, and 
ultimately by lawmakers and law enforcement agencies, there may be serious First 
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Amendment issues involved. While this paper in no way condones or supports hateful 
ideologies, it is imperative to remember, as the American Civil Liberties Union notes, 
that “Constitutional rights must apply to even the most unpopular groups if they’re going 
to be preserved for everyone.” 
 
  
 
 
Assessing Advocacy Group Data in Hate Group Research 
 
Hate. The word itself is powerful simply sitting on the page. It is what rhetoricians, such 
as Richard Weaver, refer to as a devil term: a word or phrase that evokes visceral, 
negative reactions, such as disgust or anger (Pullman, 2013). Terms such as pedophile, 
fascist, un-American, and bully are other classic devil terms. Merriam-Webster defines 
hate as “intense hostility and aversion usually deriving from fear, anger or sense of 
injury,” or “extreme dislike or antipathy.” While the dictionary stresses intense or 
extreme hostility, American colloquial English can also employ the term for lesser, even 
trivial forms of dislike such as “I hate broccoli.” Hate, like its god term counterpart, love, 
is extremely evocative, and yet because the emotion each word produces are unique to 
each individual, it is difficult to define them broadly across the board. The ubiquitous 
terms mean different things to different people (Lee, 47). 
 In the second half of the 20th century, the term hate group began to appear in the 
media and academic journals with increasing regularity. Originally, the term was applied 
to violent groups, such as the modern Ku Klux Klan, racist skinheads, and neo-Nazis, 
whose underlying philosophies are built specifically on overt hatred of other races, 
religions and ethnicities, but over a relatively short period, starting in the late 1980s, the 
term was increasingly applied to groups with differing ideologies and no intent of 
violence whatsoever. Organizations, and even individuals, who oppose U.S. immigration 
policies on economic or political reasons, or those who oppose same-sex marriage for 
religious reasons are routinely lumped in with jack-booted thugs by their political 
opponents as a means of stigmatizing and delegitimizing them. 
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 There is no fixed or universal definition for hate group. While the thought may be 
abhorrent to many, it is entirely legal under the First Amendment of the Constitution to 
don Nazi regalia or form a KKK Klavern, many of which are actually incorporated legal 
entities. Because these activities are protected, there is no legal definition by which to 
determine what constitutes a hate group. Often the designation is in the eye of the 
beholder, or, as the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart famously stated of 
pornography, “I know it when I see it” (Lattman, 2007). While these informal methods 
may work well enough in private discourse, they are decidedly too imprecise for 
academic research or legal investigation, which often result in real world ramifications. 
This raises fundamental civil rights issues that affect every citizen. As notes the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which has defended the rights of neo-Nazis and 
other reviled groups, “Constitutional rights must apply to even the most unpopular groups 
if they’re going to be preserved for everyone” (ACLU, n.d). 
Given the lack of fixed definitions, the media and government agencies often turn 
to private advocacy organizations, which claim to “track” hate groups, for information on 
the size, distribution and potential threats posed by these groups. 
 The two largest advocacy groups in this field are the Southern Poverty Law 
Center (SPLC), of Montgomery, Alabama, and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) 
headquartered in New York City. While both organizations produce reports and statistics 
on hate groups, this paper will focus on the work of the Southern Poverty Law Center, its 
institutional history and the public comments of its key personnel, as it is arguably the 
largest and most often cited advocacy group in the country today.  
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 Much of the SPLC’s reputation and authority stems from the decades of legal 
work the center has done on behalf of poor and disenfranchised populations, such as 
bringing law suits against state governments to enforce minority voting rights or to 
reform substandard conditions in schools and prisons. The SPLC has won several 
landmark cases on behalf of the homeless and prison inmates. This work is important and 
seldom receives the recognition it deserves. While the SPLC continues to pursue these 
“poverty law” cases, the main focus of the organization has arguably shifted to becoming 
the premier authority on hate groups. Financial records indicate that the SPLC spends up 
to two million dollars a year on legal case costs while spending ten times as much on hate 
group research and “public education.” 
This paper will examine the nature and scope of the hate group data gathered and 
disseminated by the SPLC to assess the accuracy of the information and to better 
understand the ethical questions that arise from the uses to which that information is put 
by the organization and external stakeholders. Understanding how the SPLC built its 
reputation as a leading civil rights organization will make it possible to examine the 
accuracy of its hate group claims and how and why these claims are widely accepted by 
the media, academic researchers and law enforcement agencies.  
On Propaganda 
Because so much of the information produced by the Southern Poverty Law Center meets 
the criteria laid out in modern propaganda studies, it is worth reviewing the history and 
basic concepts of propaganda as it has been practiced in America over the past century. 
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Edward L. Bernays (1891-1995) is widely recognized today as one of the earliest 
pioneers of modern public relations and an avid supporter of the use of propaganda. In 
1928, Bernays opened his groundbreaking book, Propaganda, with the candid lines  
The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions 
of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who 
manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government 
which is the true ruling power of our country (Bernays, 2005, p. 37).  
When Bernays wrote those words between the World Wars, the term propaganda had not 
yet acquired the negative connotation it carries today. Bernays was writing factually of a 
rational system that influenced everything from the way people voted, to the cars they 
drove and the foods they ate, to the wars they fought. Such candor, such unabashed 
enthusiasm, seems crude and alien to contemporary sensibilities, where nearly every such 
sentiment is nuanced and manipulated to hide its true meaning.  
We are governed, our minds molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, 
largely by men we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in 
which our democratic society is organized.  
We are dominated by a relatively small number of persons… who 
understand the social patterns of the masses. It is they who pull the wires 
which control the public mind, who harness old social forces and contrive 
new ways to bind and guide the world (Ibid). 
Bernays, a favorite nephew of famed psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud, spent the next seven 
decades of his career pioneering, refining and perfecting the new field of public relations. 
Bernays would use his understanding of the “social patterns of the masses” to orchestrate 
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powerful public relations campaigns that significantly increased cigarette smoking among 
women, to change American eating habits on behalf of a bacon and sausage producer 
client by convincing the public that a heavier breakfast “was the most important meal of 
the day,” and to create a propaganda campaign that led to the CIA-backed overthrow of 
the democratically-elected government of Guatemala on behalf of the United Fruit 
Company in 1954, ushering in a succession of bloody, repressive dictatorships lasting for 
more than thirty years. 
Institute for Propaganda Analysis 
In response to the excesses and questionable tactics of public relations practitioners like 
Bernays in America and the growing influence of propagandists in several European 
dictatorships, a group of social scientists, led by Clyde Miller, founded the Institute for 
Propaganda Analysis (IPA) in 1937, in New York City. The stated goal of the IPA was 
To assist the public in detecting and analyzing propaganda by conducting 
scientific research and education in the methods by which public opinion is 
influenced, by the analysis of propaganda methods and devices, and by the 
distribution of reports thereon (Miller, p. 14). 
Clyde Miller, writing in 1938, decades before the unprecedented influence of television 
and the Internet on public opinion would be realized, described a world that would be 
familiar to modern readers: 
There is today especial need for propaganda analysis. America is beset by a 
confusion of conflicting propagandas, a Babel of voices, warnings, charges, 
counter-charges, assertions, and contradictions assailing us continually through 
press, radio, and newsreel. These propagandas are disseminated by political 
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parties, labor unions, business organizations, farm organizations, patriotic 
societies, churches, schools, and other agencies; also by word of mouth by 
millions of individuals (p. 12). 
In an effort to properly study propaganda and its effects on society, the IPA set out to 
accurately define the phenomenon it sought to analyze: 
But what is propaganda? As generally understood, propaganda is expression of 
opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence 
opinions or actions of other individuals or groups with reference to predetermined 
ends. 
Thus propaganda differs from scientific analysis. The propagandist is 
trying to “put something across,” good or bad, whereas the scientist is 
trying to discover truth and fact. Often the propagandist does not want 
careful scrutiny and criticism; he wants to bring about a specific action. 
Because the action may be socially beneficial or socially harmful to 
millions of people, it is necessary to focus upon the propagandist and his 
activities the searchlight of scientific scrutiny.  
Socially desirable propaganda will not suffer from such 
examination, but the opposite type will be detected and revealed for 
what it is (p. 13). 
Modern scholars have questioned some of the IPA’s primary tenets, such as the claim 
that all propagandists attempt to deceive their audiences through lies and half-truths, 
noting, as Miller implies above, that not all propaganda is negative and may even be 
socially beneficial, such as a public service announcement encouraging drivers to use 
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their seat belts, and that many of the techniques described are also used in legitimate 
advertising campaigns. 
 The IPA closed its offices upon America’s entry into World War II in 1941, 
possibly to avoid undermining Washington’s own war-time propaganda efforts, but its 
lasting legacy was a list of seven rhetorical techniques or devices that are still useful for 
identifying possible propaganda. These seven devices will form the lens through which 
this paper will examine much of the hate group data produced by the Southern Poverty 
Law Center. 
The Seven Devices 
Although there is some overlap between the following techniques, and not all content that 
employs them is necessarily propaganda, the seven devices, as laid out in the IPA’s Fine 
Art of Propaganda, offer a useful “rule of thumb” approach to examining claims made by 
individuals and organizations. 
Name Calling: Giving an idea a bad label—is used to make us reject and condemn the 
idea without examining the evidence (Lee, p. 26). 
Glittering Generality: Associating something with a “virtue word”—is used to make us 
accept and approve the thing without examining the evidence (p. 47). 
Transfer: Carries the authority, sanction, and prestige of something respected and 
revered over to something else in order to make the latter acceptable (p. 69). 
Testimonial: Consists in having some respected or hated person say that a given idea or 
program or product or person is good or bad (p. 74). 
Plain Folks: The method by which a speaker attempts to convince his audience that he 
and his ideas are good because they are “one of the people,” the “plain folks” (p. 92). 
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Card Stacking: Involves the selection and use of facts or falsehoods, illustrations or 
distractions, and logical or illogical statements in order to give the best or the worst 
possible case for an idea, program, person or product (p. 94). 
Band Wagon: Has as its theme, “Everybody—at least all of us—is doing it”; with it, the 
propagandist attempts to convince us that all members of a group to which we belong are 
accepting his program and that we must therefore follow our crowd and “jump on the 
band wagon (p. 105). 
To reiterate, many forms of communication rely on one or more of the seven devices, 
which is why the SPLC’s use of them must be examined along with other factors, such as 
the accuracy of the information given and the context in which the claims are being 
made.  
Getting Down to Basics: The Hate Group 
The Southern Poverty Law Center, the advocacy group that is arguably the most 
widely cited in media, academic and law enforcement reports, has no fixed definition for 
hate group beyond the open-ended claim that, “All hate groups have beliefs or practices 
that attack or malign an entire class of people, typically for their immutable 
characteristics,” (SPLC, Hate Map, 2016). This claim, which neglects to address even the 
most fundamental aspects of a useful definition, such as how many members are required 
to constitute a “group,” is imprecise and may be intentionally ambiguous so as to allow 
for a broader range of interpretations. The SPLC is the sole arbiter of the hate group label 
and receives no external oversight or review. The hate group designation is little more 
than the public opinion of a private advocacy group.  
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The term “hate group” itself is a prime example of the name calling propaganda 
device. The primary function of name calling is to isolate, delegitimize, and dehumanize 
perceived opponents, creating suspicion in the mind of the audience and effectively 
shutting down all conversation and debate. Who, after all, would engage intellectually 
with a “hater”? Name calling also establishes the classic “us-and-them” false dichotomy 
and implies that anyone who is not demonstrably antagonistic toward “hate groups” must 
therefore be sympathetic to them. As with most propaganda, the intent is to bypass 
critical reasoning, which requires a degree of motivation and active participation by the 
audience, by appealing to the audience at a more emotional, subconscious level, leading 
them to a predetermined conclusion.  
The undefined “attack and malign” criterion is cited as part of an annual Hate 
Map, which purports to identify all of the SPLC-designated hate groups in the country on 
a state-by-state basis over the course of the previous year. The Hate Map is the keystone 
for all of the SPLC’s hate group claims and it is the Hate Map numbers that are 
referenced in media, academic and law enforcement reports. The SPLC’s Hate Map 
makes two other important claims: “Listing here does not imply a group advocates or 
engages in violence or other criminal activity,” and “Hate group activities can include 
criminal acts, marches, rallies, speeches, meetings, leafleting or publishing” (Ibid).   
It is this first claim that is important for examining the methodologies used by 
researchers and the media as many of their claims are based on linking hate groups with 
hate crimes, based on SPLC data, but here the SPLC clearly does not make that 
correlation itself. And yet, while disclaiming any actual threats posed by alleged hate 
groups, the fact that the entire purpose behind the creation of a Hate Map is precisely to 
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imply some sort or wrongdoing by those listed on it raises serious ethical questions. The 
Hate Map exists to lead its audience to predetermined conclusions. 
Mark Potok, the SPLC’s long-time Director of Intelligence and the person most 
responsible for compiling and disseminating the annual Hate Map numbers, has stated 
publicly and repeatedly that 
Our criteria for a hate group, first of all, have nothing to do with criminality, or 
violence, or any kind of guess we’re making about ‘this group could be 
dangerous.’ It’s strictly ideological (Holiday, 2008, track 9).  
The Southern Poverty Law Center’s sole criterion for a hate group is that it rhetorically 
expresses statements or opinions about other groups that some find objectionable. This 
concept, that hate groups are purely ideological entities that pose no real criminal threat 
to society, is often overlooked by researchers. Potok’s claim that his data are “strictly 
ideological” removes any possibility of neutrality and implies a distinct bias from the 
outset.  
The second quote from the Hate Map legend, regarding “hate group activities,” 
deals with the various methods by which alleged hate groups “attack and malign” other 
groups publicly. All six of the activities listed are expressly protected civil rights as laid 
out in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Marches, rallies and meetings are 
protected under the freedom of association clause of the amendment, and publishing, 
leafleting and speeches are the fundamental acts underlying freedom of speech. 
Ironically, it is the media and academic journals, whose very existence depend on a free 
and open press, that are the main vehicles for advocating the suppression and censorship 
of hate groups solely for what they have to say, by citing SPLC claims.  
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The SPLC’s ideological change from civil rights organization to special interest 
advocacy group was done quietly and without formal public announcement. First the 
descriptor “non-profit civil rights organization” was removed from the organization’s 
website and other materials. Soon afterward, that phrase, which had been standard 
boilerplate text in all SPLC press releases for decades, was replaced by similar sounding 
phrases, such as “founded by two civil rights lawyers” or “founded during the Civil 
Rights era,” which invoke the former descriptor, but have distinctly different meanings.  
Here we find the use of both the glittering generality and transfer propaganda 
devices. Referencing the Civil Rights Movement transfers the authority and credibility of 
an actual civil rights organization without obligating the SPLC to defend the civil rights 
of everyone equally. The very name of the organization, the Southern Poverty Law 
Center, has evolved into a glittering generality itself over the years. Many people hear the 
name and associate it with poverty, civil rights, and often with austerity. Mark Potok 
offered some insight into the changing history of the group’s name during his interview 
with Vermont high school teacher Bill Holiday:  
In the 70’s … “poverty law” was actually the phrase … it was a phrase used that 
just applied to … essentially … civil rights law … to kind of human rights legal 
actions. I know a couple years ago there was a big discussion internally [at the 
SPLC], ‘Should we change our name to something else?’  
People think, you know, that it’s all about, sort of, defending poor people, 
and that’s not really, exactly what our mission is. By that time, people 
knew the name so well that, you know, we made, I think, the obviously 
right decision not to change the name (Holiday, Track 1).  
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Potok’s conclusion that changing the group’s mission without changing the name was 
purely a business strategy because of the organization’s name recognition raises ethical 
issues. Decades after the term “poverty law” largely dropped out of common usage, many 
people may mentally parse the group’s name as the “Southern poverty” law center, an 
erroneous association that the SPLC does little to correct. Despite Potok’s claim, the 
mission statement on the SPLC’s tax documents states that the group is “dedicated to 
fighting hate and bigotry and seeking justice for the most vulnerable members of our 
society,” which would imply to many that “defending poor people” is still a key focus of 
the SPLC’s mission (SPLC, IRS Form 990, 2016). The same IRS tax documents reveal 
that every year the organization receives tens of millions of dollars from donors, many 
who truly believe that they are helping the poor and “fighting hate.”  
Many donors, who receive a constant stream of fundraising materials from the 
SPLC that often imply that the organization is in dire financial straits, are unaware that 
the organization is one of the wealthiest nonprofit organizations in the country, with 
unrestricted cash reserves exceeding $300 million. The term “nonprofit” itself evokes a 
mental image of a frugal, bare-bones organization struggling to meet its financial 
obligations and which spends every scarce donor dollar on program services. In reality, 
“nonprofit” simply means that any funds accrued over and above annual operating costs 
are absorbed by the organization rather than being distributed as profits to shareholders. 
“Nonprofit” is a tax status, not a mission statement. 
While such omissions are not illegal or isolated in the nonprofit sector, they violate 
unwritten ethical norms.  
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Rhetorical ethicist Karl Wallace describes a habit of justice that should be cultivated by 
public speakers, “by selecting and presenting fact and opinion fairly” (Wallace, 1983). 
The communicator should not distort or conceal data which his audience would 
need in justly evaluating his argument. The communicator should avoid 
substituting emotionally loaded language and guilt-by-association for sound 
argument. As a personal test, we can ask: In the selection and presentation of my 
materials, am I giving my audience the opportunity of making fair judgments? (p. 
12).  
The information produced by the Southern Poverty Law Center often violates Wallace’s 
dictum by omitting or distorting key information, such as the lack of a known location or 
even the membership size for hundreds of groups on the Hate Map, relying on god and 
devil terms to evoke emotional responses from its audience, and, as is the case with 
classic propaganda, leading that audience to predetermined conclusions. These are prime 
examples of the name calling, glittering generality and card stacking devices, which the 
SPLC often employs to imply that its designated hate groups are a threat to society. 
In summary, while there is no fixed definition for the term hate group, many 
academic, media and law enforcement publications rely on numbers produced by the 
Southern Poverty Law Center in its annual Hate Map, primarily because there are very 
few other sources of data on the subject. While the SPLC definitively states that it does 
not link its designated hate groups with violence or criminality, many researchers ignore 
this disclaimer, seeking to link hate groups with hate crimes. Also, despite 
acknowledging that the groups on its list are not engaged in criminal activity, the SPLC 
actively seeks to suppress the First Amendment rights of these groups by designating 
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them as hate groups, in an effort to stigmatize and delegitimize their views. As such, the 
accuracy of term hate group, the fundamental data unit of all research on the subject, 
must be examined.  
Last, the SPLC’s decision to morph from civil rights organization to special 
interest advocacy group removes any question of the organization’s information being 
objective and unbiased, as the very nature of advocacy is to promote one view over 
others. The decision to make the change without informing the donors and other 
stakeholders is ethically dubious, especially considering the millions of people who come 
into contact with the SPCA’s claims each year, believing them to be unbiased and 
accurate.  
Morris Dees Before the Founding of the Southern Poverty Law Center 
As the SPLC is widely regarded as the primary source of hate group data, it is worth 
examining the history of the organization, its key players and the basis for its claims of 
expertise on the subject. 
The Southern Poverty Law Center was founded in Montgomery, Alabama, in 
1971 by two lawyers, Morris Dees and Joseph Levin, with the stated goal of helping the 
poor and disenfranchised to realize the benefits accruing from the landmark legislative 
achievements of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. Poverty and institutional 
discrimination were still widespread in Alabama and other states of the Deep South, and 
few lawyers were willing to risk their careers, and even their lives, by challenging the 
status quo. 
In his 1991 autobiography, A Season for Justice, Morris Dees writes that while 
still in law school at the University of Alabama in the late 1950s, he and a fellow student, 
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Millard Fuller, entered into a series of highly successful small business ventures, such as 
a birthday cake delivery service to their fellow UA students and selling fundraising 
products to civic clubs and organizations by mail. Dees claims that the latter business had 
gross sales of half a million dollars (or just over $4 million in 2016 dollars). Dees 
graduated from law school in 1960, noting that “the real bonanza was the education I got 
in direct mail” (p. 79). It was these direct mail marketing skills that would later serve to 
make the Southern Poverty Law Center one of the most financially successful nonprofit 
organizations in the country today. 
 Although Morris Dees had achieved some successes in civil rights cases by 1970, 
such as filing civil lawsuits to integrate the Montgomery YMCA and the Alabama State 
Troopers, he first came to national prominence as the co-founder, with Millard Fuller, of 
one of the most successful direct mail order businesses of the 1960s, selling a wide 
selection of domestic items from cookbooks to doormats. Dees wrote, “I learned to write 
sales copy, to design an offer, and to mail at the most opportune time” (p. 94). These 
marketing skills would later garner Dees a place in the Direct Marketing Association’s 
Hall of Fame, not for his commercial achievements, but for his fund-raising acumen 
(DMA News, 1998).   
Dees’ first foray as an attorney into the racial turmoil of the early 1960s came 
with the legal defense of his friend Claude Henley, a well-known local Klansman. On 
May 20, 1961, a bus carrying several black and white Freedom Riders was attacked at the 
Montgomery bus station by what Time magazine described as “an idiot, club-swinging 
mob of about 100 Klansmen and others” who assaulted the terrified riders and innocent 
bystanders alike before setting the bus on fire (Time, p. 18). The Freedom Riders were 
16 
 
 
 
civil rights activists, often college students, whose goal was to challenge the de facto 
segregation of interstate public transport and facilities across the South, which was in 
direct violation of federal Interstate Commerce Commission rulings, in 1961. Riding 
from state to state on Greyhound or Trailways buses, the activists were often met by 
violent mobs in major southern cities. 
Claude Henley, described by witnesses as a ringleader of the Montgomery riot 
(Arsenault, 2006), broke off from the main mob and attacked a nearby television news 
crew in town to cover the Freedom Riders’ progress. 
 Henley was soon after indicted on civil rights violation charges by Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy’s Department of Justice and he turned to Morris Dees for help. 
Dees writes that he “didn’t think twice” when it came to defending his friend, and when a 
series of hastily snapped photos depicting Henley knocking a newsman to the ground and 
kicking him repeatedly appeared in Life magazine, Dees welcomed them as proof that his 
client was not at the bus station at the time (Ritter, 1961, Dees, p. 84).  
Dees noted that his motives weren’t entirely altruistic; when Henley mentioned 
that another Montgomery lawyer wanted $15,000 to take the case, Dees, who writes he 
was initially only going to charge a paltry $500 to help his friend, immediately increased 
his fee to $5,000, or about $40,000 in 2016 dollars (Dees, p. 85). 
 Dees got the Justice Department’s charges against Henley dismissed in 1962 and 
collected his $5,000 fee, which, Millard Fuller, Dees’ law and business partner at the 
time, wrote was paid by the local Klan and White Citizens Council (Fuller, p. 47).  
 In his 2016 book, The Lynching: The Epic Courtroom Battle that Brought Down 
the Klan, which traces the life of Morris Dees and the work of the SPLC, Laurence 
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Leamer attempts to distance Dees from Henley and to write off the case as a youthful 
indiscretion on the part of a young lawyer eager to land his first big case. While Dees 
declares Henley to be a neighbor whom he felt obligated to help, Leamer claims that 
Henley was the friend of Dees’ cousin who was in need of a lawyer. “Dees was so 
excited to be sitting with a potentially paying client that he didn’t think about what he 
was doing, getting involved with Henley” (p. 130).  
 While the image of a struggling young lawyer taking any job available to keep the 
law office doors open is plausible, it contrasts sharply with what both Dees and Millard 
Fuller wrote in their respective autobiographies. Both men note that their mail order 
business was so successful at the time that they closed the law office in 1962, the year of 
the Henley trial, to concentrate their efforts on the business. Dees wrote that even before 
the Henley case, he and Fuller had earned $12,000 each in 1961 (more than $96,400 in 
2016 dollars) and Fuller wrote that by the end of 1962 the mail order business “showed a 
net profit of close to $75,000,” or more than $590,000 in today’s money (Dees, p. 82, 
Fuller, p. 40). 
 The Henley case and the huge success of the direct mail business are important in 
understanding Morris Dees, the way in which he operates the SPLC to this day, and the 
way in which the reputations of Dees and the SPLC have been deliberately crafted, which 
provides often unquestioned credibility for their hate group claims. Whatever Dees’ 
reasons were for taking the Henley case, economic necessity was not among them. Dees 
defended the violent Klansman, whose racist crimes were documented in Life magazine 
because he chose to: 
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I didn’t see representing Claude Henley as a racial thing. To make some money, I 
was taking a case that happened to be tied up with the Freedom Riders. My God, 
it wasn’t that I was interested in the Klan! I was interested in making five 
thousand dollars representing a neighbor and keeping him out of trouble (Dees, p. 
85). 
Dees was under no obligation to defend Henley, who readily raised the $5,000 for his 
defense and was hardly indigent. The fact that the partners closed the law office weeks 
after the Henley case indicates that practicing law had become secondary to their mail 
order enterprise. As for not being “a racial thing,” Dees’ acceptance of such a substantial 
amount of money from two highly racist organizations tends to negate that claim. Dees 
knew where the money came from. Millard Fuller wrote: 
 
Morris Dees and I, from the first day of our partnership, shared one 
overriding purpose: to make a pile of money. We were not particular about 
how we did it; we just wanted to be independently rich.  
During the eight years that we worked together, we never wavered 
in that resolve. And when the treasurer of our company walked 
into my office one day in 1964 to inform me that I was worth a 
million dollars, it came as no surprise. I accepted her report with 
satisfaction and turned immediately to my next goal: ten million 
dollars (Emphasis original, pp. 41-42).  
While prosperity and financial independence form the underlying basis for the American 
Dream, Fuller’s candid assessment of his partnership with Morris Dees indicates 
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motivations different than those Dees would later construct around himself. Dees has 
been portrayed as the living embodiment of Atticus Finch, the fearless, small town 
Alabama lawyer from Harper Lee’s 1960 novel, To Kill a Mockingbird, including by Lee 
herself (Dees, 2016). Dees’ embrace of comparisons to Atticus Finch represents his use 
of the transfer device, being associated with the hero of one of the most popular civil 
rights novels written, as well as the handsome and distinguished actor, Gregory Peck, 
who portrayed Finch in the 1962 film adaptation. The film won several Academy 
Awards, including the Best Actor Oscar for Peck, and remains very popular to this day.  
 Dees also employs the plain folks technique, in which the speaker implies that he 
and his audience are of the same class and share the same concerns and problems. Atticus 
Finch is depicted as a middle-class widower, struggling to raise his two young children 
alone; Morris Dees has been a millionaire since the early 1960s and resides in a 30-room 
mansion on a 200-acre estate with his fifth wife, Susan Starr (Montgomery Advertiser, 
2010). Atticus Finch walked to work each day, while Morris Dees drives a Rolls-Royce 
(Jenkins, p. 1). Both Dees and Finch are portrayed as being strong civil rights advocates 
but any similarities between them, their lifestyles, and daily realities must end there. 
While Gregory Peck’s Atticus Finch was defending a poor, black Alabama 
sharecropper’s son in 1962, Morris Dees was defending a violent Klansman. 
Dees includes another anecdote in his autobiography that relies on both the 
transfer and plain folks devices to segue his transition from Klan lawyer to civil rights 
icon. On the Sunday following the infamous Klan bombing of a Birmingham church in 
1963, killing four young, black girls, Dees writes that he and his first wife, Beverly, 
addressed the all-white congregation of his own church, asking for donations to help 
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rebuild the Birmingham church, but to no avail. “My words hit their frozen hearts and fell 
to the floor,” wrote Dees, leaving him and his wife praying silently by the altar as the 
cold-hearted congregation filed out of the church.  
“Years later, Beverly would look back on this day and say, ‘That was the 
beginning. You knew your life was going to change and you had to go on with it’” (Dees, 
p. 88). 
In 1994, a reporter asked Beverly Dees about Morris’ description of the epiphanic 
moment described in his book. After replying that the passage was beautiful and moving, 
Beverly Dees said, “I wish I’d been there to see that” (Langer, p. 260). As is the case with 
many autobiographies and memoirs, the anecdotes related are often unverifiable. Here we 
have only Morris Dees’ recollections, recorded some thirty years after the event. 
One final note on the Henley case: In 2003, Morris Dees released a second 
autobiography, A Lawyer’s Journey: The Morris Dees Story, which was little more than a 
page-for-page reprint of his 1991 Season for Justice with a new final chapter added, 
updating the work of the SPLC over the intervening years. If Dees had any compunction 
about his work for the Ku Klux Klan, or felt that his co-writer, Steve Fifer, had 
misquoted him in the original book, he made no effort to change a single word more than 
a decade later.  
 By 1965, Millard Fuller had become disenchanted with the mail order business, 
seeking a more spiritual path for his life. Fuller sold his half of the business to Dees, gave 
away most of the money he had made over the years, and would later co-found Habitat 
for Humanity, a charity that continues to build low-cost housing for the poor (Fuller, p. 
63). Morris Dees continued to operate the mail order business on his own for several 
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years before selling it for $6 million dollars in 1969, or nearly $40 million in 2016 dollars 
(Dees, p. 102). 
 Shortly after selling the business, and on the eve of founding the Southern Poverty 
Law Center with Joseph Levin in 1971, Morris Dees became involved in national politics 
when he was approached by the presidential campaign of South Dakota sSnator George 
McGovern. Dees became one of McGovern’s primary fund-raisers, applying his direct 
marketing skills to raise millions for the candidate by mail, a relatively new approach at 
the time. Dees agreed to work for free in exchange for McGovern’s extensive donor 
mailing list (Dees, p. 138). 
 That mailing list, containing the names of seven hundred thousand self-described 
Progressive voters, formed the foundation of the SPLC’s first fundraising campaigns. 
Dees would reprise his direct mail solicitation work for the Jimmy Carter, Edward 
Kennedy, and Gary Hart presidential campaigns, each time in exchange for their mailing 
lists, amassing millions of potential donor names.  
 This thumbnail history of Morris Dees and the events leading to his founding of 
the Southern Poverty Law Center is important for understanding how the SPLC’s 
credibility was created. Morris Dees was a relatively inexperienced civil rights lawyer in 
1971, having spent most of the 1960s focused on his highly successful direct mail 
ventures and not practicing law. A case can also be made that Dees’ most lucrative legal 
client was Claude Henley, a friend and known member of the Ku Klux Klan, who took 
part in a violent attack on a group of Freedom Riders, one of the most visible symbols of 
the Civil Rights Movement. Most significant for the success of the SPLC were Dees’ 
extensive direct mail fundraising skills and his database of hundreds of thousands, later 
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tens of millions, of self-described Progressive donors. That donor base is the SPLC’s 
primary audience for its hate group materials, and as with any successful business, the 
message is often tailored to the audience. 
Founding the SPLC 
Morris Dees writes of how he and his new law partner, twenty-six-year-old Joseph Levin, 
opened the Southern Poverty Law Center in 1971:  
We decided to establish a nonprofit law center. I could volunteer my time. Joe 
would need a salary, and we both needed money for expenses. I felt confident that 
my selling skills, particularly my direct mail skills, could raise enough funds for 
the venture (p. 130).  
Dees notes that he was determined not to invest any of his own funds in the venture, and 
so the first order of business was to send out fundraising letters. 
Before we could ask for money, we had to establish credibility. We needed a 
prominent figure whose presence would announce the center’s values and 
promise. Julian Bond seemed the perfect choice. 
I had never met Julian Bond. My friend Chuck Morgan… working for the 
ACLU… arranged a meeting in Atlanta. When I told [Bond] about our 
hopes and plans, he agreed to serve as president of the Law Center, a 
largely honorary position (Dees, p. 132).  
The choice of famed civil rights activist Julian Bond (1940-2015) as a “name” Dees 
could use to promote his fledgling law center was a shrewd business decision that still 
resonates with donors to this day. Bond helped to found the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) while still in college in the 1960s and worked with Dr. 
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Martin Luther King, Jr. and other noted leaders of the Civil Rights Movement. In 1965, 
Bond was elected to the Georgia House of Representatives but, being a black man, that 
body refused to seat him, citing trumped-up technicalities. Two years and one unanimous 
U.S. Supreme Court decision later, Bond was finally seated in the Georgia House and 
afterward served in the Georgia Senate into the 1980s. 
Bond’s activism and long fight for his rightful place in the Georgia legislature 
made him a household name in Progressive circles. Dees exploited Bond’s reputation by 
making him the “largely honorary” president of the SPLC (Bond is simply referred to as 
a “sponsor” in the index of both of Dees’ books) and yet subsequent articles, reports and 
many of Bond’s obituaries, refer to Bond as a “co-founder” of the SPLC, when in fact his 
main role was that of celebrity endorser and fundraiser. Clearly Julian Bond, who 
continued to reside in Atlanta during his entire presidency, some 200 miles away from 
SPLC headquarters in Montgomery, had little or no impact on the day-to-day operations 
of the center, and yet he is still cited as a driving force behind the organization. 
Dees makes no mention of money changing hands, but Bond had returned to 
college in 1971 to complete the studies that were interrupted by his civil rights work. It 
seems unlikely that he would lend his considerable name to two white lawyers from 
Alabama, whom Bond had never heard of before, without some compensation. Julian 
Bond’s personal papers, housed at the University of Virginia, in Charlottesville, shed 
some light on the question. A letter from SPLC office manager Michael Fidlow to Bond 
notes that Bond’s “fee” for September was enclosed and a handwritten note on the letter, 
presumably by Bond or a member of his staff, indicates that $1,000 was deposited in the 
First National Bank on August 23 (Fidlow, August 19, 1971). A $12,000 annual retainer 
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in 1971 would be worth more than $71,000 in 2016. Laurence Leamer’s 2016 book 
confirms Dees’ public relations motives for hiring Julian Bond:  
Although Bond was not involved in the day-to-day operations, northern donors 
saw Bond’s name prominently on the fund-raising letters, and that gave the SPLC 
instant credibility (p. 213).  
This standard propaganda technique, known as testimonial, is similar to transfer, as it is 
used to create a subliminal association within an audience between a respected individual 
and the propagandist. Testimonials are also among the oldest advertising techniques used 
and are often employed in political campaigns. Honorary President Bond was a well-
connected, well-paid celebrity spokesman for the SPLC, but little more.  
Morris Dees sought to exploit Julian Bond’s connections in the civil rights 
community by using Bond’s name to obtain mailing lists from other advocacy groups as 
well as to gain access to other prominent leaders. A later letter from Fidlow to Bond 
included copies of letters written by Dees to be signed and mailed by Bond, “because I 
feel that a letter over your signature will command greater attention than one without it.” 
Fidlow informs Bond that, “We hope to get moving in the direct-mail fund-raising efforts 
fairly quickly… and I anticipate that you’ll be of great help in recommending some 
potentially profitable mailing lists” (Fidlow, August 30, 1971).  
In another example of the transfer technique, Fidlow’s letter noted that if the first 
round of letters was successful, a second mailing would include U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices Earl Warren and Arthur Goldberg. Support from the Justices, as well as from 
Bond’s personal friend, television talk show host Dick Cavett, would greatly expand the 
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SPLC’s credibility with the public at large and with donors in particular at very little 
additional cost to Dees.  
A letter from 2000, archived at the Library of Congress, from Morris Dees to 
Elaine Eason Steele, co-founder of the Rosa and Raymond Parks Institute, gives a 
behind-the-scenes view of Dees’ use of testimonials in his fundraising materials. Dees 
informs Steele that he was completing a fundraising letter, bearing Park’s signature, that 
he would send out to various test markets to assess its profitability. “From my many 
years’ experience in direct mail, I have learned that the best way to see if an idea works is 
to do extensive testing” (Parks, January 6, 2000). 
The six-page fundraising letter, bearing the letterhead of Rosa Parks, but written 
entirely by Dees, extolls the virtues of Dees and the SPLC and invokes the work of Parks, 
Dr. King, and the Civil Rights Movement, implying a direct connection: 
 
Dear Friend, 
One person can make a difference. 
In 1955, I refused to give up my seat on a bus to a white person. I was tired of 
giving in to injustice. Many say this was the spark that set of the Civil Rights 
Movement and inspired thousands to join hands in this historic struggle. 
Now I invite you to join a new movement where you too can make a difference. 
You can do it by helping a good friend of mine in Alabama. He has started 
something which history may come to call the Tolerance Movement, and he needs 
you to be a part of it. 
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It makes me sad that 45 years after my arrest in Montgomery, hate crimes and 
intolerance are on the rise. It gives me hope that a dedicated man from my native 
state is leading the fight to help make Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s dream a 
reality. 
My friend’s name is Morris Dees. 
The letter is laced with references designed to transfer the credibility of Parks, King and 
others to Dees himself. It begs the question that if Dees was the “good friend” of Rosa 
Parks he claimed to Steele, why he would need to write such a glowing endorsement 
himself? 
 As with his agreement with Julian Bond, no mention of money is made in the 
letter, but Dees does write that the SPLC was commissioning a video on the life of Rosa 
Parks to be distributed by the organization’s Teaching Tolerance unit. Dees notes that the 
film would be made by documentary filmmaker Charles Guggenheim and makes the 
curious claim that Guggenheim had “won more Oscars than Disney Studios.” 
Guggenheim had won four Academy Awards for his documentaries by 2000, whereas 
Disney Studios had won 42 Oscars by that year, six of them for documentaries. Dees 
closes his letter to Steele using the transfer device on her behalf: “It will surely be Oscar 
material and will be entered. Who knows, maybe Mrs. Parks, you and I can stand on the 
Academy stage in a couple of years with Mr. Guggenheim.” 
Guggenheim died in 2002, according to the Internet Movie Database (IMDb), with no 
record of having produced a Rosa Parks documentary in the last two years of his life. 
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“Fighting Hate” 
For the first decade of its existence, the legal work of Morris Dees and the Southern 
Poverty Law Center concentrated on traditional civil rights legislation in the Deep South. 
Dees filed suits that defended black voting rights, challenged inhumane living conditions 
in southern prisons and mental institutions, and won a federal suit that required funeral 
homes to offer equal services to all clients, regardless of race (SPLC, 1973). The center 
also defended a number of death row inmates, often black and indigent, who otherwise 
had little access to competent legal representation. It was this kind of “poverty law” work 
that built the foundations for the SPLC’s reputation. The cases were important, but 
largely unglamorous and little known beyond the civil rights community. 
 It should be noted that the Southern Poverty Law Center continues to pursue 
traditional civil rights cases to the present. For the most part, these are cases seeking 
reform against state institutions, such as schools, prisons and mental hospitals, rather than 
on behalf of individuals. The work is important but suing the Mississippi prison system 
into providing better mental health care for inmates does not have the same donor appeal 
as “bringing the Ku Klux Klan to its knees.” The civil rights cases take a distinct back 
seat to the SPLC’s hate group work. 
By 1981, Morris Dees would initiate a major policy change that would garner 
world-wide recognition for the SPLC and make it one of the wealthiest non-profit 
organizations in the country.  
 In 1981, Dees turned his focus toward taking on the Ku Klux Klan, which was 
still active in parts of the South. One of the first cases Dees took on involved Vietnamese 
refugee shrimp fishermen operating out of Galveston Bay, Texas. The Vietnamese were 
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harassed and intimidated by local Klansmen seeking to drive them from the bay and 
reduce competition for white fishermen. Boats were burned and docks and other facilities 
were vandalized or destroyed, but local law enforcement did little to intervene. Dees 
obtained an injunction that prevented the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan from continuing to 
threaten the Vietnamese fishermen. 
 While the civil suit prevented the Klan from harassing the Vietnamese, no arrests 
were made for the burned boats or other destruction, yet the response from the donors 
was unexpectedly large. Randall Williams was a journalist hired by Dees in 1981 to form 
Klanwatch, a unit of the SPLC specifically designed to promote the SPLC’s work against 
the Klan (SPLC, 1981).  
“The money poured in,” according to Williams, quoted in a 1988 cover story in 
The Progressive magazine. “Everybody, it seems, was against the Klan. We developed a 
whole new donor base anchored by wealthy Jewish contributors on the East and West 
Coasts, and they gave big bucks.” In particular, Williams noted, “Our budget shot up 
tremendously—and still, we were sometimes able to raise as much as $3 million a year 
more than we could spend” (Edgerton, p. 14). 
 Morris Dees, who had made millions in direct-mail sales, responded to the 
unprecedented flood of donations by increasing the SPLC’s focus on the Klan and 
eventually other alleged hate groups to what many of the center’s veteran legal staff 
considered to be the detriment of the poverty law that the organization had been 
originally founded to practice. Ken Silverstein, writing in Harper’s magazine, noted that 
in 1986, the SPLC’s entire legal staff quit to protest Dees’ pursuit of the Klan, which they 
believed was a minor threat in comparison to the daily injustices facing poor Americans 
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(Silverstein, 2000). The SPLC largely gave up all of its death penalty cases, some 
maintain, out of Dees’ concern that such work might alienate some donors, and it is the 
donors who are the primary audience for the SPLC’s hate group claims. 
The tens of millions of donor dollars at stake create an undeniable financial 
incentive for the Southern Poverty Law Center to interpret the term hate group broadly 
and to exaggerate the threat that these groups, which are designated solely by the SPLC 
itself with no external oversight or review, pose to the public at large. In both fiscal year 
2014 and 2015, the SPLC reported donations in excess of $54 million each, based largely 
on its work “fighting hate” (SPLC, IRS Form 990, 2016). Clearly, such large sums may 
pose a challenge to the neutrality and unbiased accuracy of the Southern Poverty Law 
Center’s information.  
In 1987, Morris Dees initiated a civil suit against the United Klans of America, in 
Mobile, Alabama, claiming that the UKA was legally liable for the actions of two of its 
members who had been convicted in the murder of a black man, Michael Donald, in 1981 
(SPLC, 1987). Because the Michael Donald case plays such a large role in the 
reputations, and therefore the credibility of both Morris Dees and his law center, it is 
important to understand the events surrounding the murder and Dees’ civil suit several 
years later. The Donald case, more than any other, established Dee’s reputation as a civil 
rights icon. 
Late on the evening of March 21, 19-year- old Michael Donald was walking home 
alone when he was approached by two Klansmen in a car, Henry Hays, 26, and James 
“Tiger” Knowles, 17. Hays and Knowles had learned earlier that night that the trial of a 
black defendant, Josephus Anderson, charged with killing a white policeman, had ended 
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in a mistrial when the jury, composed of eleven blacks and one white, could not reach a 
unanimous verdict. Incensed, the two men went into Mobile in search of a black person 
to murder in revenge for the perceived failure of the court system. Sighting Donald, who 
was out buying cigarettes for his sister, the men pulled up to the sidewalk on the pretense 
of asking directions to a local club. When Donald approached the car, he was forced into 
the back seat at gunpoint and driven to an isolated location. 
 Laurence Leamer’s 2016 book, The Lynching, describes the events of the murder, 
in which Hays and Knowles first attempted to strangle Donald with a hangman’s noose, 
and when that failed, they beat him unconscious with a tree limb whereupon Henry Hays 
cut Michael Donald’s throat with a utility knife. The perpetrators loaded Michael 
Donald’s lifeless body, with the noose still around his neck, into the trunk of the car. 
They drove back to Hays’ neighborhood and tied the corpse to a low tree in a vacant lot 
across the street from his father’s house, using the hangman’s noose. Bennie Hays was 
the leader of the local Klan unit, UKA 900, and Henry wanted to show off his grisly 
handiwork. Two days earlier, at a meeting of Klansmen organized by the elder Hays, the 
subject of murdering a black person in retaliation had been raised, in the event that 
Anderson was not found guilty, and Henry wanted to prove that he was not “all talk” 
(Leamer, pp. 17-22). 
Framing the Donald Case 
 There are several key points in this chain of events worth closer examination. The 
media has often referred to the death of Michael Donald as a lynching, when in fact it was 
a premeditated murder. While this may seem like a fine point of law, the law is made up 
largely of fine points, and precise details matter greatly. Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
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lynching as, “…the action of unofficial persons, organized bands, or mobs, who seize 
persons charged with or suspected of crimes, or take them out of the custody of the law, 
and inflict summary punishment upon them, without legal trial, and without the warrant 
or authority of law (Blacks, n.d.).” Hays and Knowles had no belief whatsoever that 
Michael Donald was guilty of any crime, and was certainly in no way involved with the 
Josephus Anderson case. Michael Donald was simply the first convenient black person 
who came into view. 
 The word lynching is a classic devil term, in that it evokes strong, visceral 
reactions in many people. Many in the media labelled the killing of Michael Donald as a 
lynching either from a lack of knowledge of the actual meaning of the term, or to 
sensationalize their stories. Laurence Leamer certainly must have known the definition of 
the term before writing an entire eponymously titled book on the subject, but a book titled 
The Lynching has the potential to draw more attention than one titled The Murder. 
Although Morris Dees referred to the event as a murder in his 1991 autobiography (p. 
343), on the SPLC website, the general public’s primary point of access to the 
organization, refers to the “Michael Donald Lynching Case” (SPLC, 1984). Had Hays 
and Knowles abducted Josephus Anderson after the mistrial and murdered him in an act 
of extrajudicial summary punishment, only then would the term lynching properly apply. 
Describing the murder of Michael Donald as a lynching is no more accurate, legally, than 
calling it a bank robbery. 
 Many media accounts of the murder, including reviews of Leamer’s book, also 
claim that Michael Donald was hanged from a tree, which reinforces the stereotypical 
concept of a lynching in the public mind. Yet, as Leamer notes in his account of the 
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crime, which draws heavily from pages 212-214 of Morris Dees’ autobiography, Donald 
had been deceased even before his body was loaded into the trunk of Hays’ car and 
driven back to Mobile. Author B.J. Hollars interviewed retired Mobile County Coroner 
LeRoy Riddick for his book on the Donald murder, Thirteen Loops: Race, Violence and 
the Last Lynching in America (2011). Riddick, who had pronounced Michael Donald 
dead at the scene in 1981, determined from the subsequent autopsy that Donald had 
indeed died of asphyxiation, but also noted that “He was in a striking position because of 
the rigor mortis, indicating to me that he had died somewhere else and had been hung 
from a tree, rather than being hanged” (p. 141). 
It is yet another fine point of law, but to say that Michael Donald was hanged 
from a tree implies that that was the cause of his death, which is more evocative than 
noting that his lifeless body was hung, which is to say, suspended, from a tree.  The 
inaccurate use of the terms lynching and hanged by the media, Hollars, Leamer and the 
Southern Poverty Law Center are designed to evoke an emotional reaction from their 
respective audiences. Researchers who repeat this phraseology in their work are 
perpetuating hyperbole rather than insisting on impartial accuracy in the terminology of 
the events that transpired.  
“Bringing the Klan to its Knees” 
The Michael Donald murder case is especially important for the role it played in 
creating Morris Dees’ reputation for fighting hate groups and as a champion of civil 
rights. Without a doubt, taking on even the fractured Klans of the 1980s was still 
dangerous work. Morris Dees received multiple death threats and the first headquarters of 
the SPLC in Montgomery was damaged by arsonists in 1983. Dees emphasized the 
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threats to him and the law center in his fundraising letters, and as Klanwatch editor 
Randall Williams noted, donations poured in faster than they could be spent. This 
reputation, which would be enlarged and embellished in subsequent years, forms a 
primary basis for the Southern Poverty Law Center’s public image, and plays a 
significant part in the willingness of the media, academics and law enforcement agencies 
to accept SPLC claims as accurate without vetting them whatsoever.  
 In Mobile, the investigation into the murder of Michael Donald moved forward 
slowly. Leamer writes that the Mobile Police Department, whose members may have had 
family and other ties to the United Klans, were determined to deflect suspicion from the 
KKK (p. 40). Instead, acting on a tip from a questionable witness, they arrested three 
other men, alleging that they had beat and killed Donald over a botched drug deal and 
then displayed the corpse as a warning to other dealers. Initially, the arrests satisfied the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, which had no purview to investigate routine local 
murders. It was only the persistence of Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas Figures and 
extensive investigation by the FBI on civil rights violations grounds that brought Hays 
and Knowles to trial in 1984, two-and-a-half years after the murder. “Tiger” Knowles 
was persuaded to testify against his friend Henry Hays in return for leniency, and in short 
order, both men were convicted of the murder of Michael Donald by an all-white jury. 
Henry Hays received the death penalty and Knowles was sentenced to life in prison.  
 Morris Dees wrote that he attended the Hays trial as a spectator and returned to 
Montgomery determined to bring a civil suit against the United Klans, Bennie Hays and 
UKA founder and Imperial Wizard, Robert “Bobby” Shelton (p. 214).  
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I didn’t know whom we would sue or exactly what our theory would be, but that 
really didn’t matter. This was the most gruesome racially motivated murder in 
almost twenty years. We’d find something. 
One more factor motivated me: The torching of the Center had made my 
battle against the Ku Klux Klan personal as well as philosophical (Ibid). 
Dees correctly surmised that bringing a civil suit against Hays and Knowles would be of 
little value, as both convicts were essentially “judgment-proof,” unable to pay any 
monetary damages (p. 218). Instead, Dees proposed that as Hays and Knowles had acted 
as “agents” of the United Klans of America, a civil suit seeking damages against the 
UKA might be viable, just as similar suits against other corporations for the actions of 
their agents had been filed for decades (p. 219).  
Before Dees could proceed, he had to obtain the cooperation of Beulah Mae 
Donald, Michael’s 66-year-old mother, as she would have to serve as plaintiff in the case. 
Some media accounts claim that Mrs. Donald sought out Morris Dees’ help, but Dees 
confirms that it was he who sought out Mrs. Donald through her family attorney, Michael 
Figures, the brother of the assistant U.S. attorney, who had reopened the murder case in 
1984 (p. 223). Dees wrote that he warned Mrs. Donald that there was very little chance of 
receiving much in monetary damages, noting that “Winning money for Mrs. Donald was 
not my principle aim” (Ibid). This is a significant statement as it contradicts much of the 
subsequent “bringing the Klan to its knees” narrative constructed by Dees following the 
trial.  
In brief, Dees filed a civil suit against the United Klans of America, Henry Hays, 
Bennie Hays, Tiger Knowles, Bobby Shelton and others in 1987 for their part in the 
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wrongful death of Michael Donald. In a civil suit, the court does not appoint attorneys to 
advocate for indigent defendants, as it does in criminal cases. Of the nine men named in 
the complaint, only Imperial Wizard Bobby Shelton was represented by counsel at the 
trial. The other defendants, largely uneducated, were little match for the SPLC’s 
multimillion dollar resources and soon turned against each other on the stand in hopes of 
sparing themselves. The jury accepted Dees’ “vicarious liability” argument, that the 
United Klans were responsible for the criminal actions of its agents, and on February 12, 
1987, awarded Beulah Mae Donald $7 million in damages (SPLC, Final Judgment, 
1987). 
As Dees predicted, Beulah Mae Donald had little chance of recovering more than 
a fraction of the damages awarded. The sole asset the UKA possessed of any value was 
its “national headquarters” building in Mobile. Dees estimated its value at $250,000, but 
an obituary for Mrs. Donald in the New York Times cited estimates of between $150,000 
and $200,000 (NYT, 1988). In the end, the building sold for just under $52,000, the price 
weighed down, according to Dees, because of the notoriety surrounding the property. The 
amount of money Mrs. Donald received is relevant as it is indicative of how Morris Dees 
exploited her son’s murder, and Mrs. Donald herself, to the profit of the Southern Poverty 
Law Center.  
Ken Silverstein, writing in Harper’s magazine in 2000, noted that while Mrs. 
Donald was awarded $7 million, of which she received less than 1% in actual cash, the 
SPLC had “made more than $9 million from fundraising solicitations featuring the case, 
including one containing a photo of Michael Donald’s corpse (2000). While it was 
important for the jurors in the Donald v. UKA case to see police photos of Michael 
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Donald’s beaten and bloated corpse, there was no justifiable reason to include such a 
gruesome image in fundraising materials other than for sheer shock value. With Morris 
Dees and any legal staffers already on the SPLC payroll, the actual costs of the Donald 
case would have fallen well within the annual legal budget already allotted for the year. 
There was no need to exploit Michael Donald’s corpse beyond pure fundraising motives, 
and Mrs. Donald did not receive any of the $9 million in donations. Dees included the 
photo in both editions of his autobiography as did Laurence Leamer in his book about the 
Donald case. 
Additionally, Dees noted that the SPLC fronted Beulah Mae Donald the $52,000 
from the sale of the UKA building until that transaction could be finalized. Mrs. Donald 
used the money to move out of public housing into a new home of her own (p. 331). Dees 
included photos of himself handing Mrs. Donald the keys to her new home in subsequent 
publicity materials, as though the house was a gift from him. Beyond the issue of 
exploiting Mrs. Donald in this patronizing manner is the question of the $52,000. If, as 
Dees contended, the UKA building was worth more than $250,000, with the sale price 
depressed by the publicity surrounding the trial, why did not Dees, or any of his wealthy 
friends or donors, or the SPLC itself, offer to pay Mrs. Donald the full value of the 
property, in expectation that its value would return as the publicity around it diminished 
with time? Beulah Mae Donald, who was in poor health before the second trial, would 
die less than a year after moving into her new home, as Dees and Leamer noted, largely 
from the stress of the murder of her son and the subsequent Klan trials (Dees, p. 332, 
Leamer, p. 303). 
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In the end, the Mobile chapter of the UKA was bankrupted, though as Dees noted 
before the trial, the group had little in the way of assets to begin with. The Mobile district 
attorney also brought charges against Bennie Hays and Frank Cox, the UKA Klansman 
who had provided the rope used in the attack on Donald. Bennie Hays would escape trial 
by a series of heart attacks, actual or feigned, and Cox would be sentenced to life in 
prison for being an accessory to the murder. The Mobile chapter of the UKA was 
effectively neutralized, but most members were not directly affected by the trial, and the 
most recent Hate Map lists 190 Klan groups in the country today, nine of which allegedly 
reside in Alabama, including a chapter of the United Klans of America. The SPLC’s own 
data would indicate that the Ku Klux Klan was hardly “brought to its knees” by Morris 
Dees. 
Klan Trials as Fundraising Events 
Despite crafting a public image as a man driven to destroy the Ku Klux Klan, 
Morris Dees has demonstrated a friendliness and congeniality with individual Klansmen 
that seem incongruous with that mission, starting with Dees’ ongoing friendship with 
Claude Henley. Similarly, a 1991 article in People magazine featured an interview with 
“Bubba” Dees, the “wily Alabamian” who “uses the courts to wipe out hate groups” 
(Shaw, 1991) During the interview, Dees revealed that he had recently been in contact 
with Tiger Knowles, one of Michael Donald’s confessed murderers: 
A few weeks ago, Dees accepted a collect call to his office from James 
“Tiger” Knowles, one of the men doing time for the Mobile lynching. 
‘What you doin' callin' me collect, boy,’ Dees laughed. ‘You done escaped 
or something?’ Tiger was calling to get Dees's [sic] advice on a book he's 
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writing. ‘You get a contract, I'll look at it for you, Tiger. Did I treat you 
right in my book?’ Dees asked. 
Leamer wrote that at the end of the Donald trial, Dees approached two of the co-
defendants who had just been found liable in the murder and who were “staggered that 
they would be yoked to this financial burden for the rest of their lives. The lawyer walked 
over to them and put his arms on their shoulders. ‘Hey, don’t worry,’ he said. ‘We’re 
after the Klan and Bennie [Hays], not you guys’” (p.300). 
Dees’ collegial demeanor with some of the men responsible for “the most 
gruesome racially motivated murder in almost twenty years” seems incongruous, 
considering the importance Dees and SPLC fundraising materials attach to the case. Part 
of the reason may be that the individual Klansmen involved generally have little to 
nothing in the way of assets to turn over to the plaintiffs. They are ancillary to the larger 
case. The real money, if not for the plaintiffs, comes in the form of the tens of millions of 
dollars donated to the SPLC in response to Dees targeted fundraising campaigns. 
Legal ethicists have long recognized a tendency for some lawyers to deviate from 
professional ideals in pursuit of justice for its own sake. Daniel Markovits observes:  
On the one hand, lawyering is intimately connected to the deep and 
enduring ethical ideals of respect for persons that justice involves. On the 
other hand, the legal profession also has an ethically troubling aspect. 
Lawyers—at least when they function as adversary advocates—do not 
pursue justice itself, directly and impartially. Instead they are charged 
loyally to represent particular clients, whose interests and aims may 
diverge from what justice requires (p. 11).  
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In the case of Morris Dees, his client is often his own organization. 
One final incident regarding Morris Dees’ personal relationship with the Ku Klux 
Klan and his own demeanor comes by way of an anecdote Mark Potok related to 
schoolteacher Bill Holiday in 2008. Potok describes the details of an event where a 
Klansman named Jeff Berry gave an interview to a local television news crew, then, 
thinking better of it, demands the tape of the interview from the crew at shotgun-point. 
Potok says the police did nothing in response to the reporter’s complaint and so the SPLC 
stepped in: 
About a year later… well, we sued very quickly… well, it was shortly after that, 
and we easily won a judgment against Berry. You know, this was absolutely false 
imprisonment, right? I mean, it was a felony crime (Holiday, track 5).  
On page 101 of both of his autobiographies, Morris Dees writes about a similar event that 
followed the 1983 arson attack on SPLC offices in Montgomery. Believing the fire to be 
the work of the United Klans, Dees invited his friend, Klansman Claude Henley, to visit 
him in his office. When the unsuspecting Henley arrived, Dees called Imperial Wizard 
Bobby Shelton on the speakerphone. Dees and Shelton were on a first name basis years 
before the Michael Donald case, with Shelton likely authorizing the payment of Dees’ 
legal fee in the Henley case in 1962:  
When Shelton answered, I told him what the Klan had done to my 
building. Reaching behind the drapes in my office I pulled out the 
Browning automatic shotgun I’d bought after receiving the threatening 
letter. I aimed it at Claude. “Tell Bobby what I’m doing, Claude,” I said. 
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Claude’s cigar was shaking. So were his knees. He described the shotgun 
to Bobby in vivid detail. I put a shell in the chamber. “Now tell him what 
I’m doing, Claude,” I ordered. Claude again obliged. 
“Bobby,” I said, “I’m going to blow this son of a bitch’s head right 
off of his goddamn neck. You don’t fuck with me now.”  
I looked up at Claude. “You think I’d shoot you, Claude?” 
“Yes, yes. I think you’d do it.”  
Bobby interrupted. “Claude,” he said, “if you can talk to somebody 
down there and find out what’s going on, you tell him to let Morris 
alone. Just leave him alone.”  
I smiled at Claude. “Okay, Bobby,” I said into the speakerphone. 
“That’s it.” 
I put down the gun. The color came back into Claude’s cigar (p. 
101).  
Despite having only Dees’ expletive-laden account of the alleged events, Dees is clearly 
admitting to committing the exact same felony crime as Jeff Berry. Under Alabama state 
law, most felonies have a three-year statute of limitations (AL § 15-3-1 et seq) with the 
exception of “Any felony involving the use, attempted use, or threat of, violence to a 
person” (Fitzpatrick, n.d.). Dees’ boastful threat to blow Claude Henley’s head right off 
his neck with a shotgun would appear to meet all of those conditions. 
First Amendment Issues 
Dees would repeat his “vicarious liability” strategy several more times over the 
years, with similar results: highly publicized trials with huge financial judgments against 
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the defendants, of which the plaintiffs receive a small fraction. Dees himself has spoken 
of the efficacy of his “fish in a barrel” style of bringing civil suits against largely indigent 
defendants. In reference to a case brought against members of a skinhead group convicted 
for the murder of an Ethiopian immigrant in Portland, Oregon, Dees wrote: 
We chose state court because Oregon discovery rules are quite different 
than the federal rules. You can do trial by ambush in Oregon. You have no 
interrogatories, no production of evidence; you don’t have to give the 
names of the witnesses or give the other side your documents (Dees, 
February 11, 1991). 
Predictably, the defendants in these cases, many of whom have no alternative than to 
attempt to defend themselves, are easy targets for Dees’ trained lawyers and such “trial 
by ambush” techniques. The plaintiffs, who are required to relive some of the most 
traumatic moments of their lives, receive a pittance compared to the millions of dollars 
the SPLC will receive from its donors. Dees can claim that justice has been served in his 
public relations materials, but it is his organization that is the primary beneficiary of these 
suits, which is why it is often the SPLC that contacts the victims initially, offering to file 
civil complaints on their behalf, at no cost to them whatsoever.  
 Some in the legal profession have raised concerns that Dees’ civil suits violate 
fundamental First Amendment rights to freedom of speech as they seek to bankrupt 
groups based on their ideologies, which promotes a chilling effect on others who would 
express similar views. Attorney Jason Saccuzzo writes that Dees’ choice of civil suits 
allow him to “sidestep” the First Amendment protections mandated by the U.S. 
Constitution and upheld by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, in 1969 (p. 402). 
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In Brandenburg, Ohio, Ku Klux Klan leader, Clarence Brandenburg, was charged with 
advocating violence during remarks he made during an interview with a reporter from a 
local television station. “We're not a revengent [sic] organization, but if our President, 
our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's 
possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken” (Ibid). 
 While Brandenburg’s semi-literate comment did not explicitly call for violence, 
he was nonetheless found guilty and sentenced to ten years in prison under an obscure 
1919 law enacted to suppress the fledgling Communist Party in America. Brandenburg’s 
appeal, that his First Amendment rights to free speech and his Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to equal protection under the law were being violated, was rejected by the Ohio 
Court of Appeals, and the Ohio Supreme Court refused to even review the case. The U.S. 
Supreme Court agreed with Brandenburg’s arguments and reversed his conviction, 
finding that “constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State 
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such 
advocacy is directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action” (p. 403). 
 Saccuzzo argues that Dees’ strategy of using common tort law in local courts 
against hate groups is denying those groups the civil rights his organization purports to 
defend. As noted, defendants in civil suits must provide their own legal counsel, no 
indictment is required to bring a civil suit, and attorneys for the plaintiffs are not required 
to show “proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” in their accusations. Additionally, Saccuzzo 
notes, “in a civil suit there is “no double-jeopardy limitation,” as mandated under the 
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Fifth Amendment (p. 406). In most cases, the defendants have little chance of standing up 
to Morris Dees’ multimillion-dollar law firm.  
 In one such case, after two skinheads were found guilty of the murder of an 
Ethiopian immigrant in Portland, Oregon, in 1988, Morris Dees filed a vicarious liability 
suit against Tom Metzger, a vocal white supremacist living in California. Dees’ argument 
was that the skinheads were incited to the murder by Metzger’s hate-filled rhetoric. 
Metzger, who was never charged in the murder case by any court and was not even in 
Oregon at the time of the crime, attempted to defend himself against Dees, and 
predictably lost everything to a $12.5 million ruling against him. 
In an article titled Punish Deeds, not Speech, Ray Jenkins, of the Baltimore Sun, 
wrote at the time: 
What Dees did was convert the civil law, whose basic purpose is to settle disputes 
between individuals, into an arm of the criminal law. In legal abracadabra, the 
standard of proof in civil cases – usually only “preponderance of the evidence” – 
is a good deal easier to meet than the higher standard of “guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt” required in a criminal prosecution. 
Jenkins, a journalist, raised the question of civil liberties and the chilling effect such 
lower court decisions could have on free speech.  
But the question is, will the message stop with hate groups? Let's not forget, there 
are cases on record where civil law was tortured into criminal law to punish 
communists in the 1950s, then civil rights groups, including the NAACP, in the 
1960s. There was even one celebrated case in which an Alabama jury attempted 
to destroy the New York Times in 1963 by using the civil action of libel as a 
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criminal action. The U.S. Supreme Court swiftly put a stop to that nonsense 
(Jenkins). 
While many SPLC supporters may cheer such civil suits, they may not be aware of the 
threat posed to their own civil rights. One cannot revoke the rights of one person without 
revoking them for all. 
SPLC as Unbiased “Watchdog” 
Dees may claim that his tort suits are “bringing the Klan to its knees” in his public 
relations materials, but in actuality, he is seeking to stifle their unpopular speech. As the 
SPLC’s spokesman, Mark Potok, has stated, his organization’s hate group designation is 
not based on violence or criminality, but solely on ideology. Potok makes it very clear 
that the SPLC, rather than being the unbiased civil rights watchdog group portrayed in its 
fundraising and public relations materials, is an organization with a definite agenda with 
regard to these groups. In a 2007 speech to an anti-hate crime group, Potok said 
I don’t think there’s any doubt that these are human beings and it’s a 
mistake to regard them as just a bunch of sociopaths… though most of 
them are. Let me say… our aim… sometimes the press will describe us as 
monitoring hate groups and so on. I want to say plainly that our aim in life 
is to destroy these groups. Completely destroy them! (Potok, 2007). 
The following year, Potok informed a group of high school teachers visiting the SPLC 
headquarters that 
We see this political struggle, right? …I mean we’re not trying to change 
anybody’s mind. We’re trying to wreck the groups, and we are very clear 
in our head, this is… we are trying to destroy them. Not to send them to 
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prison unfairly or not take their free speech rights away… but as a 
political matter, to destroy them (Holiday, track 13). 
As a political matter, the SPLC has clearly “taken sides,” and considering that the 
organization’s donor base is composed largely of thousands of self-identified 
Progressives, it is little wonder that much of the SPLC’s research warns of “Right-wing 
extremists,” “the Radical Right,” and “the Far Right.” The use of such epithets once 
again relies on the classic propaganda technique of name calling, by which the SPLC 
dehumanizes and delegitimizes its perceived opponents in the minds of its audience. 
When asked by a journalist from The Blaze network in 2012 why the SPLC did not 
consider the Occupy Wall Street movement to be a hate group, Potok replied, “We’re not 
really set up to cover the extreme Left” (Morgenstern, 2012). 
 Confirming their recent transition from civil rights organization to special interest 
advocacy group, the SPLC has lately embarked on a series of civil law suits, including 
simple copyright infringement and consumer fraud cases involving LGBT plaintiffs, 
which have nothing to do with civil rights but are intended to impress its largely 
Progressive donor base. While researchers and law enforcement agencies would hesitate 
to accept data provided by other agenda-driven advocacy groups at face value, such as 
the National Rifle Association (NRA), the SPLC is often granted a double standard and 
its hate group claims go largely unvetted. 
The Montgomery Advertiser Series 
In 1994, Dan Morse and Greg Jaffe, two reporters from the Montgomery Advertiser, that 
city’s largest daily newspaper, published a week-long series of articles examining the 
Southern Poverty Law Center and Morris Dees. The articles, under the broader title of 
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Charity of Riches, claimed that Morris Dees was the sole power behind the law center 
and had turned his focus from traditional civil rights cases to the far more lucrative hate 
group suits. In one article, A Complex Man: Opportunist or Crusader?, Dan Morse noted 
that, despite receiving millions in donations and amassing more than $52 million in its 
endowment fund, the SPLC had only filed four law suits in the previous four years 
(February 14, 1994).  
 Several of the findings of Morse and Jaffe’s 8-day exposé contradicted the 
SPLC’s public image of a struggling, storefront civil rights group that was always in 
desperate need of cash. Citing SPLC tax records for the previous ten years, Morse and 
Jaffe (referred to henceforth as Morse) determined that the SPLC raised $62 million in 
donations, but only $21 million in “program costs.” Morse noted that during the same 
period, the amount of interest received on the SPLC’s investment portfolio exceeded the 
$21 million in “program costs.” The article notes that “program costs” is a fairly elastic 
term, as the SPLC engaged in (and continues to engage in) the widespread, yet highly 
subjective accounting practice known as “joint costs” (February 13, 1994). 
The SPLC’s most recent audited financial statement describes “joint costs” as  
Activities and the production of materials which combine development, 
education, and management functions are allocated to the program and supporting 
services on the basis of the content of the material, the reason for its distribution, 
and the audience to whom it is delivered (SPLC, October 15, 2015, p. 14).  
In layman’s terms, “joint costs” are development expenses (i.e. “fundraising”) that are 
allocated to other departments within the nonprofit organization’s structure. For fiscal 
year 2015, the SPLC’s auditors declared that 
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The Center incurred joint costs of $8,430,301 for educational materials 
and activities as part of fundraising appeals during the year ended October 
31, 2015. Of those costs, $1,822,279 was allocated to management and 
general expense, $2,608,065 was allocated to development expense, and 
$3,999,957 was allocated to program expense (Ibid).  
In 1994, Morse demonstrated that “joint costs” accounting allowed the SPLC to claim 
that it spent only $2.6 million on fundraising and development costs, or 19.8% of its 
budget, a figure within the fundraising guidelines advocated by most charity watchdog 
organizations. Using those same guidelines, minus the “joint costs” allocation, Morse 
determined that the SPLC actually spent $5.7 million, or 42% of its budget on fundraising 
(Morse, Feb. 13, 1994).  
While joint costs accounting is not illegal, and is practiced by many of the largest 
nonprofits and charities in the country, it is ethically ambiguous, according to Charity 
Navigator, one of the leading industry watchdogs. “Although the use of this accounting 
“trick” is often perfectly in line with the accounting rules for the reporting of joint 
solicitation costs (AICPA SOP 98-2) these rules allow for many interpretations and 
judgments that can produce questionable results” (CharityWatch [sic], 2013). Among the 
questionable results in the 2015 audit is that by adding the $8.4 million in joint 
fundraising costs to the $9.3 million specifically designated for fundraising, the final 
costs exceed $17.7 million, or 42% of the budget, which significantly exceeds both the 
32% fundraising figure cited by the SPLC (Financial Information, 2016) and the 35% 
best practices guideline established by Charity Navigator. 
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Morse and Jaffe also criticized the SPLC’s ongoing fundraising campaigns, which 
at that time revolved chiefly around direct mail solicitations written by Morris Dees. 
Many of Dees’ impassioned pleas implied that his organization was in dire straits, though 
Morse published financial figures indicating that the SPLC had spent only 18% to 31% of 
its budget on program services and held millions of dollars in cash reserves (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. SPLC Financial Information (Source: Montgomery Advertiser, Feb. 13, 1994) 
 
A former SPLC staffer, civil rights attorney Tom Turnipseed, recounted how one mailing 
included a return envelope carrying “about six different stamps.” The intent behind this 
use of the plain folks device, according to Turnipseed, was to imply that the SPLC was 
strapped for cash. “It was like they had to cobble them all together to come up with 35 
cents” (Morse, February 13, 1994). In another case, this time using a bandwagon 
approach, in a 1995 fundraising letter co-signed by a local Montgomery rabbi, Dees 
referred to himself by his full name, Morris Seligman Dees on letters targeted at Jewish 
donors (Egerton, p. 14). Dees, and his father, Morris Seligman Dees, Sr., come from a 
long line of Southern Baptists, but were named in honor of a prominent Montgomery 
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Jewish businessman whom Dees’ grandfather had admired (Dees, p. 53). Southern 
historian John Egerton quotes former SPLC lawyer, Ira Burnim, “Morris used his middle 
name in mailings to Jewish ZIP codes. The intent, I assume, was to boost returns” 
(Egerton, p. 14.). 
While neither of these techniques are expressly illegal, as with the joint costs 
“accounting trick,” they do challenge the ethics of Dees’ and the SPLC’s fundraising 
practices. The Direct Mail Hall of Famer continues to employ questionable “gimmicks” 
to the present day, as will be examined in detail further in this paper, which further 
challenge the accuracy of the SPLC’s primary claim to authority, its hate group data. 
Ken Silverstein documented another significant discrepancy between the center’s 
claims and actions: 
Back in 1978, when the center had less than $10 million, Dees promised that his 
organization would quit fund-raising and live off interest as soon as its 
endowment hit $55 million. But as it approached that figure, the SPLC upped the 
bar to $100 million, a sum that, one 1989 newsletter promised, would allow the 
center “to cease the costly and often unreliable task of fundraising” (Silverstein, 
2000). 
The SPLC’s cash endowment fund reached the $100 million mark in 2002, the $200 
million mark in 2007, and the $300 million mark in 2014. Far from “living off interest,” 
the SPLC has continuously expanded its fundraising machinery, as noted in a 2011 
advertisement for a regional advancement director (RAD) “to join our growing major 
gifts team,” and a 2013 ad for a “planned giving officer” tasked with convincing donors 
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to include the SPLC in their wills. Morris Dees shows little indication that he plans to 
“cease the task of fundraising” anytime soon. 
 “No Blacks in Center’s Leadership” 
One of the most damning allegations made by the Montgomery Advertiser exposé deals 
with race relations within the Southern Poverty Law Center. A February 16, 1994, article, 
“Equal Treatment? No Blacks in Center’s Leadership,” opens with a charge of 
institutional racism at one of the country’s leading civil rights organizations: 
Outside the Southern Poverty Law Center, a stunning civil rights 
memorial honors those who died to give blacks more opportunities. Inside, 
no blacks have held top management positions in the center’s 23-year 
history, and some former employees say blacks are treated like second-
class citizens (Morse, February 16, 1994). 
Morse and Jaffe contacted 13 black former SPLC staffers and found that 12 of them 
experienced or observed racial problems at the center, three claimed to have heard racial 
slurs and three likened the SPLC to a “plantation.” When asked about the charges, Morris 
Dees responded, “There ain’t no plantation mentality. If that was the case, I don’t know 
what blacks would be doing in the positions they are…” At the time, the SPLC had no 
black attorneys and the only African American in a managerial role oversaw the mail 
room. Dees followed up with the statement, “It is not easy to find black lawyers. Any 
organization can tell you that” (Ibid). Dees’ claims that there was a dearth of qualified 
black lawyers in 1994 willing to work for one of the nation’s most celebrated civil rights 
law firms appears simplistic on the surface. 
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Dees makes another unusual statement in the piece while commenting on the lack 
of diversity at the SPLC:  
Probably the most discriminated people in America today are white men 
when it comes to jobs because there are more of those who had more 
education opportunities and who the test scores show are scoring better 
and on paper look more qualified. That’s why you have so many reverse 
discrimination cases around. 
Dees’ statements that he couldn’t find any black lawyers and that white men were “the 
most discriminated people in America,” are incongruous, coming from an alleged civil 
rights icon. The article also cited law center records that indicated that the organization’s 
Teaching Tolerance unit, charged with promoting diversity in the K-12 classroom, was 
staffed entirely by whites.  
Ken Silverstein’s Harper’s article noted that there were still no blacks in positions 
of authority as of 2000, and a review of SPLC online tax records from 2001 onward 
indicate that none of the highest paid executives have been persons of color. The SPLC 
website also indicates that 19 out of 20 of its senior program staff in Montgomery are 
white. 
While Teaching Tolerance does not release the names of its staff, SPLC 
documents indicate that, except for a brief interregnum in 2009, its directors since its 
founding in 1991 have been white. 
Lecia Brooks, the only African American on the SPLC’s senior program staff, has 
been with the SPLC since 2004 and currently serves as both outreach director and 
director of the SPLC’s Civil Rights Memorial Center. Despite holding two concurrent 
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directorships at the center, Brooks has never been named among the organization’s 
highest paid staff, even in years when the lowest salaries listed dipped to $70,000. 
Brooks’ term as “interim director” of Teaching Tolerance is not listed in her 
organizational biography (SPLC, Lecia Brooks, 2016). Brook’s directorships, like Julian 
Bond’s “honorary presidency,” may have more to do with public relations than with 
actual substance.  
“Friendly Board” 
All nonprofit organizations are required to have boards of directors in order to 
qualify for tax-exempt status. The National Council of Nonprofits defines the role of the 
directors as “…the fiduciaries who steer the organization towards a sustainable future by 
adopting sound, ethical, and legal governance and financial management policies, as well 
as making sure the nonprofit has adequate resources to advance its mission” (NCON, 
n.d.).  
As fiduciaries, board members are charged with determining the organization’s 
mission and purpose, selecting the chief executive (and providing periodical evaluation of 
same) and providing financial oversight, among other duties (Bridgespan, n.d.). As such, 
the board is expected to act independently of the organization’s executives, acting in the 
best interest of the organization and its donors. 
The February 19, 1994 installment in the Montgomery Advertiser series raises a 
number of ethical questions about the SPLC’s board of directors. In Friendly Board: 
Friends, associates fill board, Dan Morse wrote that the SPLC’s board up to that time 
had included friends of Morris Dees, past and present employees of Dees,’ Dees’ divorce 
lawyer and his personal physician, as well as Morris Dees himself. The Morse article 
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implies that a board composed of Dees’ personal friends and former employees was not 
independent and quoted, among others, Julian Bond, Millard Fuller and National 
Charities Information Bureau President, Ken Albrecht, who shared Morse’s concerns. “I 
think what you’re talking about is a one-man show,” said Albrecht. 
Morris Dees denied those allegations, quoted by Morse in the article as stating, 
“Our board of directors runs the center,” as did SPLC co-founder, Joe Levin, who was 
also serving as both president or the organization and chairman of the board at the time. 
“I ain’t nobody’s rubber stamp,” said Levin. A letter dated February 23, 1972, from then-
SPLC-President Julian Bond to prominent North Carolina politician, Martha Clampitt 
McKay, indicates otherwise. Bond, who was tasked early on by Morris Dees with 
submitting a list of names of prominent civil rights activists, “mostly from the south,” to 
compose the center’s first board of directors (Fidlow, August 19, 1971), was responding 
to McKay’s earlier letter complaining that she was “…sick unto death of seeing all of 
these male dominated boards…” (McKay, 1972). Bond’s reply, apologizing for the 
composition of the board, closes with the statement that, “It’s no consolation, I’m sure, 
but it’s not a real Board, in that it has no decision making ability [sic], and is purely 
advisory” (Bond, February 23, 1972). 
Contemporary defenders of the SPLC often point to the organization’s current 
board of directors as proof of its commitment to the diversity that is otherwise lacking in 
the organization’s leadership. A review of the 16 board members pictured on the SPLC 
website indicates that two of the four African Americans on the board are listed as 
“Emeritus,” including Patricia Clark, who resigned from the board in 2010, and the late 
Julian Bond. In total, six of the members listed are no longer serving but their inclusion 
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on the web page gives the impression that the board is larger and more diverse than it 
actually is (SPLC, Board of Directors, 2016). Among the current members are former 
SPLC staffers, Jocelyn Benson and Howard Mandell, Morris Dees’ divorce lawyer, who 
was profiled as a sitting board member in Morse’s 1994 article. 
It would appear that far from running the center, as claimed by Morris Dees, the 
SPLC’s current board of directors continues an unbroken legacy of serving in a purely 
advisory role, as noted by Julian Bond. Such a crony-laden body may lack the ability to 
make any real contributions to  running  the Southern Poverty Law Center and casts one 
more doubt on the objectivity of the information it produces. 
“A Very Rough Measure” 
Having reviewed the early history of the Southern Poverty Law center and examined 
some of the fundraising and public relations techniques employed by Morris Dees, this 
paper will now take a closer look at the actual data the SPLC produces and disseminates, 
and the uses to which that information is put.  
To recap, the SPLC’s sole criterion for its “hate group” designation is that Group 
X “attacks or maligns an entire class of people, typically for their immutable 
characteristics.” While Group X may have a documented history of making overtly racist, 
homophobic or simply unpopular (to certain audiences) comments about other groups, 
this is the extent of the SPLC’s “hate group” designation. Any claims beyond “Group X 
says negative things about Group Y” are implied by the primary users of the SPLC’s 
data, such as the media, law enforcement and the SPLC itself, exceeding the scope of the 
SPLC’s extremely elastic definition, usually with some financial goal, such as attracting 
advertisers, justifying public funding and outright fundraising in mind.  
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The SPLC receives no external review or oversight. Inclusion on the hate group 
list is at the sole discretion of the SPLC. Other than overwhelming public criticism, such 
as that which followed the designation of brain surgeon and then-U.S. presidential 
candidate, Dr. Ben Carson, as an “extremist” for his religious views on same-sex 
marriage, there is no formal mechanism for appeal or removal from the list. Carson was 
removed from the extremist list only when the public outcry grew too large for the SPLC 
to ignore (SPLC, February 11, 2015). 
The SPLC provides no information on its designated groups that researchers or 
journalists could use to verify the size or even the very existence of those groups. In 
many cases, the SPLC does not even identify a known city or town where the alleged 
group is believed to be located. In many cases, the “group” exists as nothing more than a 
post office box or one-man website. 
The SPLC’s methodology is imprecise and unscientific. A 2009 article in the 
Appleton (WI) Post-Crescent reported that, “Mark Potok, who has directed the SPLC’s 
Intelligence Project for 12 years, said the report relies on media, citizen and law 
enforcement reports, and does not include original reporting by SPLC staff” (Potok, July 
6, 2009). 
It should also be noted that the Hate Map is published every spring and represents 
the SPLC’s group count for the previous fiscal year. Given that hate groups routinely rise 
and fall, even by the SPLC’s reckoning, there really is no reason for the Hate Map to be 
static in today’s online world. Groups that cease to exist after the map is published in 
March continue to be counted throughout the entire year. Conversely, if a hundred new 
groups arose in April, the public would not become aware of them for another eleven 
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months. News and other informational websites are updated daily and even hourly and, 
given the SPLC’s growing web and social media staff, there are no technical reasons for 
the Hate Map not to become dynamic as well, if its intent is to provide information about 
potentially dangerous threats. 
In actuality, the purpose of the Hate Map count is to provide a fixed talking point 
for SPLC publications. Referencing totals from the previous year provides a fait 
accompli, a hard fact, upon which to base SPLC claims. A dynamic map would not only 
allow new groups to learn of their inclusion on the list in real time, but would also allow 
them to challenge those claims in real time. A group included on the static map can be 
reliably referenced for the entire following year. 
The Hate Map purports to identify the number of hate groups across the United 
States, on a state-by-state basis. 
 
Figure 1. SPLC Hate Map (2016). Source: Southern Poverty Law Center.  
 
The map is interactive to the extent that users can click on individual states to identify 
57 
 
 
 
hate groups alleged to exist in their local region. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. SPLC Hate Map for Virginia (2016). Source: Southern Poverty Law Center 
 
It is at the statewide level that accuracy of the SPLC’s hate group count is clearly called 
into question, as many of the alleged groups are not affiliated with any known city or 
town that could be used by a researcher to verify the existence of the group. 
 In previous Hate Maps, these groups would simply be identified by name and 
state, as with the American Nazi Party in this example, but as of the 2016 map, the 
creators have inserted the term (statewide) in place of the empty location slot. Whereas a 
brick-and-mortar business like the Virginia Publishing Company will have a fixed 
address that can be definitively verified, researchers can only take the SPLC’s word that 
the “statewide” groups actually exist.  
 While the lack of a fixed address does not necessarily mean that an alleged hate 
group does not exist within a state, the responsibility for proving the claim lies with the 
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organization making the claim. Those groups lacking any verifiable confirming 
information should be removed from any list used for research purposes. In the most 
recent iteration of the Hate Map, 175 of the 892 groups claimed are unaffiliated with any 
known city or town, or 20% overall. 
Laird Wilcox and the SPLC 
 Laird Wilcox is a veteran researcher of interest groups on both the left and right 
of the American political spectrum who has written extensively on the Southern Poverty 
Law Center and other advocacy organizations. Wilcox compiled annual guides to these 
interest groups from 1979 to 2000, verifying each group’s contact information prior to 
publication (Wilcox, 1991, 1991b).  His growing collection of more than 10,000 books 
and 100,000 pieces of ephemera is housed in the Wilcox Collection of Contemporary 
Political Movements at the University of Kansas, in Lawrence, dates back to 1965 
(University of Kansas, n.d.).  
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Figure 3. Wilcox Guides to the American Right and Left (1991). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Excerpt from Guide to the American Left (Wilcox, 1991) 
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Writing in his definitive work on hate group advocacy organizations, The Watchdogs, 
Wilcox commented on the many unaffiliated groups on the SPLC’s Hate Maps:  
What [the SPLC] apparently did was list any group they could find 
mention of, including groups only rumored to exist. These included the 
large number of “post office box chapters” maintained by Klan and 
skinhead organizations. Some Christian Identity “ministries” consist of 
only one person and a mailing list and many “patriot groups” consist of 
but three or four friends. 
They also listed many groups whose actual affiliation is neither 
KKK nor neo-Nazi and who would argue with the designation of 
“white supremacy.” In short, they misleadingly padded their list.  
When the SPLC releases their list, either in print or on the Internet, it fails 
to contain actual addresses that might be checked by journalists or 
researchers. Several listings refer to “unknown group” and the name of a 
city or town (Wilcox, The Watchdogs, p. 79). 
 In 2015, shortly after that year’s Hate Map designated 40 hate groups in New Jersey, 
giving it the fourth highest total in the country, Mark Pitcavage, Director of Investigative 
Research at the Anti-Defamation League, publicly reiterated Wilcox’s “padding” claims 
in the South Jersey Times:  
According to Mark Pitcavage, director of investigative research at the 
Anti-Defamation League (ADL) the SPLC has a habit of counting single 
individuals as groups or chapters, which can give a skewed impression of 
hate groups in any given state. “The [SPLC’s] list is wildly inflated,” said 
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Pitcavage. “They list skinhead groups in places where there are no 
organized groups, but instead it’s just a couple of individuals” (Laday, 
2015). 
In 2010, Wilcox sat for an interview with a writer from the Social Contract Journal, for 
inclusion in an issue entirely dedicated to the examination of the Southern Poverty Law 
Center. Although the SPLC has designated the Social Contract Press as a hate group for 
its views on legal and illegal immigration, and has dismissed Wilcox as having “an ax to 
grind,” Wilcox, who describes himself as a liberal, has nothing to gain by critiquing the 
methods and actions of the SPLC. Wilcox produced guides to fringe groups on either 
political extreme for more than two decades, confirming the existence of each group 
personally. Wilcox’s observations in the Social Contract interview underscore many of 
the main points of this paper. Regarding the SPLC’s hate group methodology  
The Southern Poverty Law Center acquired my guides and incorporated many of 
my listings in theirs, but there was a huge difference: their lists had no addresses 
so it’s very difficult to actually check them out. The SPLC has listings I had never 
heard of and I know this area pretty well. Even my own contacts in various 
movements had never heard of some on SPLC’s list. After 1995, I had calls from 
police agencies trying to locate some of the SPLC’s “hate groups.” They couldn’t 
find them either. I concluded that a lot of them were vanishingly small or didn’t 
exist, or could even be an invention of the SPLC. 
Regarding his first awareness of the SPLC as an “anti-racist watchdog” organization: 
About the time they emerged on the scene. Initially, the ideas implied by the name 
“Southern Poverty Law Center” sounded kind of appealing, like an organization 
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that would help poor people deal with their legal problems. After a few years it 
became apparent that it was nothing like that. 
On assessing the SPLC’s alleged political agenda: 
In looking over their fundraising stuff, I could see that they were sensationalizing 
racial conflict issues, and when their reports on “extremist” groups began 
appearing it was obviously a bogus fundraising scheme that was into demonizing 
and blacklisting. It reminded me so much of similar operations that were aimed at 
leftists during the fifties and sixties, that I concluded it was basically modeled 
after them. 
On the media’s willingness to accept SPLC hate group data as valid: 
What really needs to be done is for some major newspaper or network to take the 
SPLC’s list and investigate a random selection of a couple hundred or so “hate 
groups” and publish what they find. I think you would have a major scandal. The 
media just rolls over for them. Anti-racism is a major industry today and to 
question the Southern Poverty Law Center is viewed as unsympathetic or even 
racist, in much the same way that questioning the [anti-Communist] Church 
League of America might have been viewed as unpatriotic forty years ago. This is 
a movement that has gone into an ideological overdrive and has developed many 
of the destructive traits that characterize moral crusades, including the 
demonization of critics and dissenters. 
On the actual threat posed by alleged hate groups: 
There was another phenomenon I noticed. Several racist groups published large 
numbers of local post office box listings, as in local chapters. When I tried to 
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check these out I found that many of them were false—the box was closed after 
one rental or that the mail was forwarded elsewhere. I think a lot of these never 
existed or were just some guy renting different post office boxes. I also received 
tip-offs that some of the right-wing groups I had listed were really intelligence-
gathering operations with no objective membership, some by federal or state 
agencies and some by groups like the SPLC, which admits having informants 
throughout the far right. By the 1990s, these were becoming increasingly 
common. Even local anti-racist activists will frequently operate bogus groups just 
to see who responds. One of the reasons I stopped publishing my research guides, 
aside from burning out on the whole subject, was that I could no longer vouch for 
the authenticity of the organizations. The web finished this completely. A single 
person with web page skills can create a very impressive “hate” operation that 
exists nowhere except in cyberspace. The whole issue of “lists” is full of smoke 
and mirrors. 
Regarding the SPLC’s motives, which may also be shared by other stakeholders, such as 
researchers and law enforcement agencies that rely on SPLC hate group data: 
The dirty little secret behind the SPLC is that they actually need racial violence, 
growing “hate groups,” and more racial crime to justify their existence and 
promote their agenda. Read between the lines of what they keep pushing and you 
have to wonder if they’re not into wishful thinking or even trying to encourage 
something. If you approach the SPLC using a variation of classical game theory, 
you can see that with each violent act, additional “hate” group, and racial incident, 
the SPLC’s status improves. They have everything to gain: fundraising goes up, 
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they get more media exposure, their credibility increases, and their political 
usefulness to the far left surges. I’m not the only one saying this, by the way, but I 
think I’m the only one who speaks openly about it. 
On the ethics of the SPLC’s hate group designations: 
When you get right down to it, all the SPLC does is call people names. It’s 
specialized a highly developed and ritualized form of defamation, however—a 
way of harming and isolating people by denying their humanity and trying to 
convert them into something that deserves to be hated and eliminated. They 
accuse others of this but utilize their enormous resources to practice it on a mass 
scale themselves. Anyone attacked by the SPLC is basically up against a contest 
of resources, from the ability to engage legal counsel, to the access to fairness in 
media treatment, to the ability to survive the financial destruction of a reputation 
or a career. What they do is a kind of bullying and stalking. They pick people who 
are vulnerable in terms of public opinion and simply destroy them. Their victims 
are usually ordinary people expressing their values, opinions, and beliefs—and 
they’re up against a very talented and articulate defamation machine. 
For a veteran extremist group researcher as Laird Wilcox and for Mark Pitcavage, who is 
Mark Potok’s opposite number and frequent collaborator at the ADL, to publicly accuse 
the SPLC, and map manager Potok by extension, of “wildly inflating” their hate group 
statistics, there must be some identifiable issue with the accuracy of Potok’s count. It is 
worth noting that the 2016 Hate Map count for New Jersey dropped nearly by half, from 
40 to 21 alleged groups, in large part by eliminating 14 chapters of the AC Skins.
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2015 2016
AC Skins Abescon NJ AC Skins Atlantic City NJ
AC Skins Atlantic City NJ
AC Skins Brick NJ
AC Skins Brigantine NJ
AC Skins Camden NJ
AC Skins Galloway NJ
AC Skins Hamilton Township NJ
AC Skins Little Egg Harbor NJ
AC Skins Maramora NJ
AC Skins Pemberton NJ
AC Skins Pine Hill NJ
AC Skins Somers Point NJ
AC Skins Wildwood NJ
AC Skins Woodbine NJ
  
Table 2. New Jersey Hate Group Count, 2015-2016 
 
 The obvious question is what became of the 14 AC Skins chapters that Potok 
identified on the 2015 Hate Map? Were they shut down overnight by the main chapter in 
Atlantic City (the “AC” in AC Skins) or did they ever exist at all? In either case, Mark 
Potok included them in his “definitive” hate group count for the year and those numbers 
were widely cited in countless news reports and research articles.  
The AC Skins were not the only hate group to exhibit significant losses that year. 
Eight chapters each of the Free America Rally and White Boy Society on the 2015 map, 
all of which were unaffiliated, were entirely missing from the 2016 map. Mark Potok 
gave no explanation for the removal of these groups (Table 3). 
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2015 2016
Free America Rally CA
Free America Rally GA
Free America Rally ID
Free America Rally LA
Free America Rally MA
Free America Rally NY
Free America Rally OR
Free America Rally WA
White Boy Society AZ
White Boy Society CA
White Boy Society CO
White Boy Society IL
White Boy Society MO
White Boy Society VA
White Boy Society WI  
Table 3. Free America Rally and White Boy Society Counts, 2015-2016. 
 
The Council of Conservative Citizens, the modern successor to the White Citizens 
Council that paid Morris Dees’ legal fees for defending Klansman Claude Henley in 
1962, dropped from 23 alleged chapters in 2015 to only ten in 2016. Seventeen entirely 
unaffiliated chapters of the Aryan Terror Brigade from 2015 were reduced to three 
chapters in 2016, although one had been assigned to Haddon Township, New Jersey 
(Table 4).  
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2015 2016
Aryan Terror Brigade AK Aryan Terror Brigade Haddon Township NJ
Aryan Terror Brigade CA Aryan Terror Brigade FL
Aryan Terror Brigade FL Aryan Terror Brigade WV
Aryan Terror Brigade KY
Aryan Terror Brigade LA
Aryan Terror Brigade MA
Aryan Terror Brigade MO
Aryan Terror Brigade NE
Aryan Terror Brigade NV
Aryan Terror Brigade NY
Aryan Terror Brigade OH
Aryan Terror Brigade OK
Aryan Terror Brigade OR
Aryan Terror Brigade PA
Aryan Terror Brigade VA  
Table 4. Aryan Terror Brigade Count, 2015-2016 
 
The number of National Socialist Movement chapters dropped from 49 to 46 that year, 
overall, but the number of unaffiliated chapters remained at 29, or an incredulous two out 
of every three chapters across the country. 
Perhaps the most egregious example of Hate Map padding occurred in 2011, 
when Mark Potok assigned 20 chapters of the Georgia Militia to that state. While the 
SPLC also maintains a separate count of alleged militia groups, this organization 
appeared on the Hate Map that year (Table 5). Of the alleged chapters listed, fully 90% of 
the total, 18 out of 20, were unaffiliated with any known location and were simply 
represented by 18 empty slots on the Georgia map key. Mark Potok provided no 
information on these chapters whatsoever, but all 18 empty slots were counted in the final 
hate group total for that year. 
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2011
Georgia Militia Blairsville General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia Camden County General Hate  
Table 5. Georgia Militia Count, 2011. 
 
By 2012, the number of alleged Georgia Militia chapters had dropped to 14, with 12 
unaffiliated chapters, one allegedly located somewhere in Camden County and one 
marked “Statewide” (Table 6). 
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2012
Georgia Militia Camden County General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia General Hate
Georgia Militia Statewide General Hate  
Table 6. Georgia Militia Count, 2012. 
 Again, all 14 chapters were included in the final total for 2012. By 2013, the 
Georgia Militia had been removed from the Hate Map entirely, again begging the 
question as to how accurate the SPLC’s information was to begin with. It should also be 
noted that, unlike the Ku Klux Klan, racist skinheads and neo-Nazis, which each have 
their own unique categories on the Hate Map, the SPLC assigned the Georgia Militia to a 
catch-all category of “General Hate.” The General Hate category includes “Anti-LGBT, 
anti-Immigrant, Holocaust denial, racist music, and radical traditionalist Catholic groups. 
A final “other” sub-category includes groups espousing a variety of hateful doctrines 
(SPLC, General Hate, 2016).” As it is the SPLC that ultimately determines which 
doctrines are “hateful,” the General Hate designation can cover numerous, unrelated 
groups with one blanket claim. 
 Another important catch-all technique is Potok’s use of the “Statewide” 
designation, which allows his organization to claim the presence of a group within a state 
based on the flimsiest pretext and without providing any corroborating evidence of its 
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existence. As Laird Wilcox claimed, and as Mark Potok confirmed to the San Luis 
Obispo Tribune in 2009, “inclusion on the list might come from a minor presence, such 
as a post office box” (Potok, March 25, 2009). 
 On September 27, 2011, Mark Potok was invited to speak at James Madison 
University to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. At 
the end of his presentation, “The State of Hate in America: The Radical Right Since 
9/11” (Potok, September 27, 2011). I had the opportunity to ask Potok directly about the 
unaffiliated groups on his Hate Map. The question seemed to have caught Potok off 
guard, and in his response he touched on the accuracy of his hate group count and the 
“statewide” designation. Below is a transcript of the exchange in its entirety:  
Question: Mr. Potok, every year your organization produces a “Hate 
Map” that purports to identify the number of “hate groups” in 
individual states across the country. This past spring, according to 
your accounting, the number was up to 1,002, but if you actually go 
in… if you Google the map and look at it…, 262 of those groups aren’t 
affiliated with any town or city or anything. They’re just kind of 
floating out there in limbo. 
Mark Potok: Sure. Well, these aren’t... I mean, look, let me tell you a little 
bit about how we do the “hate group” map. I understand the criticism and 
it’s not an illegitimate criticism. Let me first of all say, that we do the 
“hate group” map and the counts, and so on, as a very rough measure… 
I’m not talking about the individual towns and such… as an attempt to get 
a feel for what the Radical Right looks like. Is it growing? Is it shrinking? 
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And so on. And, you know, I will admit right up front, I mean, is… are 
two groups with two people in them worse than one group with four 
people in them? Well, maybe not… it’s the same thing. But, what we’ve 
seen historically is that counts do seem to… very clearly… go up and 
down… we now see it going up again and we can see it reflected 
anecdotally. What you are asking about, and it’s true, we have a lot of 
groups that we can’t identify in a town, and you know, I’ll say we can’t 
always… it’s an imperfect process… because we’re forced to… many 
times we know quite a lot about a group. Other times we don’t know much 
more, uh, other than a particular Klan group… What those basically are, 
those are state-wide units… that’s what those groups are… So, the 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan might have a chapter in Harrison, Arkansas, 
they may have a chapter in another town, and so they might also have an 
Arkansas chapter, and in those cases, we don’t know where the chapter is. 
Q: But the media doesn’t see it that way. They quote you verbatim, 
saying that there are 1,002 groups out there. 
MP: Well, that’s, that’s what there are out there… 
Q: But you can’t locate them. You claim there are 221 Klan groups in 
the U.S., but you can’t locate 109 of them. 
MP: Sorry? 
Q: You claim there are 221 Klan groups in the U.S., but you can’t 
locate 109 of them. That’s fifty percent. That’s quite a discrepancy. 
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MP: You said it yourself, it’s more like 20% of the overall numbers 
[unintelligible]. And I’m telling you… the reasons I’m not telling you it’s 
not possible that some claims of some statewide group that doesn’t exist. 
We’re often looking at these groups… I mean, one of the criteria we use 
when looking at these groups… we’re trying to separate out the real 
groups that really do things from one man and a computer 
[unintelligible]… In other words, separating out the real interest blogs… 
or, you know, a site on the Internet, from groups that actually do 
something. So one of the things we try to establish [unintelligible]… is 
that group active? Has it had a rally? Is it publishing? Propaganda of one 
kind or another? Can you join that group? Those kinds of things. 
After conceding that the question was “not illegitimate,” Mark Potok made several 
important points about the Hate Map hate group count that directly undermine any claims 
of accuracy. Stating that his counts were anecdotal, “a very rough measure” and an 
“imperfect process,” Potok attempted to deflect the observation that the media accepted 
his claims that there were 1,002 hate groups in the country in 2010 as accurate and true 
even after conceding, by his own reckoning, that he could not locate more than 250 of 
them. “That’s what there are out there.” 
 Potok’s claim that the 262 unaffiliated hate groups on that year’s map were 
“statewide” chapters is equally dubious. By that accounting, that year the Georgia Militia 
would have had one chapter in Blairsville, one somewhere in Camden County and 
eighteen individual “statewide” chapters as well.  
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 Potok further claims that his count excludes one-man blogs and other individual 
endeavors (“Can you join that group?” “Is that group active?”) and yet there are 
numerous examples of just such “groups” on every Hate Map, many of which fall under 
the category of “General Hate.” On March 13, 2012, Daniel Greenfield noted that his 
blog, clearly titled, “Sultan Knish. A Blog by Daniel Greenfield” had been designated a 
“hate group” by the SPLC (Greenfield, 2012).  
Greenfield was amused that his clearly identified one-man blog was listed with 
other “active groups,” (“…because I jogged a few miles yesterday…”) such as Casa 
d’Ice, an Italian restaurant and bar “located on K-Mart Plaza in Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania” (Ibid). In an article in Esquire magazine from November 2, 2016, Potok 
described the neo-Nazi website, The Daily Stormer, which is frequently referenced on the 
SPLC website, as “…mostly Andrew Angelin, his dog, and his computer” (Carpentier, 
2016). All three one-man “groups” were listed on the 2016 Hate Map.  
 Over the years, Mark Potok has made numerous public statements that ought to 
give pause to any researcher or professional journalist considering taking the SPLC’s hate 
group claims at face value: 
Potok acknowledged that some of the groups may be small and said it is 
impossible for outsiders to gauge the membership of most of the groups 
(Crary, 2008). 
The Southern Poverty Law Center in Montgomery, Ala., estimates 
more than 100,000 followers among the various hate groups, 
though a spokesman [Mark Potok] concedes that the tally – from 
periodicals, news reports and police – is approximate. ‘The 
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numbers are absolutely soft,’ said Mark Potok, a Southern Poverty 
Law Center spokesman. ‘We are talking about a tiny number of 
Americans who are members of hate groups – I mean, 
infinitesimal.’ (Levinson, 1999).  
The SPLC routinely promotes the Ku Klux Klan as an ongoing threat in its fundraising 
materials, listing 190 chapters on the 2016 map (49 of which are unaffiliated) yet Mark 
Potok has publicly dismissed the importance of the Klan since 2010: 
The Klan of today is small, fractured, impotent and irrelevant. (Crisp, 
2010). ‘The Klan is a sorry shadow of its former self. It’s common for the 
KKK to brag about big numbers, but usually they are largely outnumbered 
by the counter-protesters,’ Potok said. ‘Even on the white supremacist 
scene, the Klan is seen as less important today,’ he said. ‘They just don’t 
have the people to put on the street, no matter what they boast about,’ 
Potok said (Martin, 2010). 
The 2011 Hate Map included 221 alleged chapters of the KKK (109 of which, as noted, 
were unaffiliated) and yet, within weeks of the map’s release, Mark Potok publicly 
pronounced the demise of the “Invisible Empire” for all intents and purposes:  
But Potok said the Klan has disintegrated. ‘There is no Klan now,’ he said, 
‘only a collection of squabbling organizations’ (Lambert, 2011)’ ‘The 
Klan today is weak, poorly led and without any sort of centralized 
organization,’ Mark Potok, a senior fellow at the Southern Poverty Law 
Center, told Vocativ. The SPLC tracks extremist groups like the KKK. 
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‘It’s even looked down upon by other hate groups – they look at them as 
these country bumpkins, and they’re generally right’ (King, 2016).  
Clearly, Mark Potok and the SPLC view the Ku Klux Klan as a minimal threat, and yet 
the Klan is invoked in SPLC fundraising materials at every opportunity. 
“A Black Man in the White House” 
Considering how much time, effort and money the Southern Poverty Law Center has 
spent tracking the Ku Klux Klan over the decades, Mark Potok’s pronouncement that the 
Klan had “disintegrated” attracted little or no attention from the media. Given the 
hundreds of millions of donation dollars the SPLC has raised over the same period, by 
invoking the Klan in its fundraising materials and press releases, and the fact that the 
most recent Hate Map claims 190 Klan groups (a remarkable increase of 164% over the 
previous year) Potok’s report of the death of the Klan was either premature or greatly 
exaggerated. Or, since Potok’s hate group claims go entirely unvetted by the media and 
most researchers, he is ultimately the sole arbiter of the final KKK chapter count, to 
paraphrase Lewis Carroll, meaning exactly what he chooses it to mean, “Neither more 
nor less.” 
 This paper has cited many of Mark Potok’s contradictory public statements on 
hate groups, from claiming that the number of people involved in hate groups is 
“infinitesimal,” to the accuracy of his own Hate Map tool. What follows is an 
examination of some of Potok’s most widely repeated claims, which by their repetition 
create a public impression of Potok and the SPLC as experts on the subject of hate 
groups.   
In the 2008 Holiday interview, Mark Potok makes this statement:  
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I think a lot of people feel, ‘Oh, groups like the Southern Poverty Law Center, 
they find, you know, the two hundred Nazis running around the country, they 
build them up into great big groups, they make a big deal about it and then ask for 
your money.’ Right? In other words, it’s kind of a scam. You hype up this little 
tiny threat into something scary, uh, and then go and try to make money off of it 
(Holiday, track 2). 
Potok’s candid comment sums up the beliefs of “a lot of people” primarily because even 
when he does claim to “find two hundred Nazis running around,” he provides little or no 
evidence to support his claim, and, as his Georgia Militia and other hate group numbers 
previously discussed indicate, he cannot locate them on his own Hate Map.  
 One common persuasion technique Potok employs often in his materials is the use 
of statistics, based on his own data. Every year the Hate Map will cite the percentage by 
which the number of hate groups has allegedly increased since 2000. In the most recent 
iteration, the number of groups has increased by 48% since the turn of the century. 
Percentages are a popular device with persuaders because they imply significant change 
without examining the actual numbers involved. For example, any group on the Hate 
Map can be said to have “jumped by 100%” by climbing from one to two alleged 
chapters. Mathematically correct, but methodologically dubious. As Potok is the sole 
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arbiter of the hate group count, and he does not have to provide any proof of existence, he 
can set the totals at any level he chooses.  
By the same token, it can be noted that the SPLC’s cash endowment fund (98% 
percent of which is designated “unrestricted”) has grown by 205% since 2002, based in 
large part by donations prompted in response to Mark Potok’s annual Hate Map statistics.  
 
Figure 5. SPLC Endowment Fund by Year. 
Another recurring theme in SPLC hate group materials has been Mark Potok’s 
widely repeated claims of “explosive growth” in the number of hate groups since the 
2008 election of Barack Obama as U.S. president. Potok’s claim that the alleged growth 
was chiefly fueled by “a Black man in the White House and the tanking economy” is 
largely contradicted by his own statistics.  
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Figure 6. SPLC Hate Group Graph (2016). Source: Southern Poverty Law Center. 
As shown on Potok’s hate group graph (Fig. 6) in 2009, the first year of the Obama 
presidency and arguably the worst year of the Great Recession, the number of hate 
groups only increased by six, or about one half of one percent, and the smallest increase 
in SPLC history. Potok claimed 70 new hate groups for 2010, but in that same year the 
number of unaffiliated groups, including the Georgia Militia, increased by 99, which 
represents a net loss, overall. The number of hate groups increased by a modest 1.6% in 
2011, from 1002 to 1016, yet this was the same year that Mark Potok declared the Ku 
Klux Klan to be “disintegrated.” It seems unlikely that the nation’s oldest and largest hate 
group would experience such a sharp decline in membership during a time of “explosive” 
racist sentiments. 
From 2012 to 2014, following President Obama’s successful reelection campaign, 
Potok’s graph indicates a virtually unprecedented decline in his hate group count, from 
1007 to 784, or a drop of more than 22%. Clearly, Mark Potok’s prediction of “explosive 
growth” in hate groups doesn’t stand up to his own numbers. Even if one accepts Potok’s 
claims of 92 new hate groups forming between 2008 and 2012, ignoring that 99 new 
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unaffiliated groups were among his count, this 10% increase is completely wiped out by 
the 22% plunge coinciding with President Obama’s second term. And yet, as recently as 
June 2016, SPLC President Richard Cohen was repeating Potok’s claims in testimony 
before a Congressional subcommittee on terrorism, albeit without mention of the 
subsequent 22% plunge. 
Recent Resurgence 
Mark Potok’s hate group graph (Fig. 6) concludes with a 14% increase in his hate group 
count between 2014 and 2015, from 784 to 892 groups in all. While this represents an 
increase of 108 groups in 2015, Potok’s Hate Map indicates “explosive growth” in two 
particular categories, the Ku Klux Klan and Black Separatists, which account for a full 
187 new groups between them, which did not exist on the previous year’s map. 
 While Mark Potok and other SPLC representatives are widely quoted in the media 
warning of the “unprecedented expansion” of Klan groups by 164%,” from 72 to 190, 
between 2014 and 2015, when compared with Potok’s total of 163 Klan groups in 2013, 
the increase over the two-year period is 27 groups, or 17%. Nonetheless, many media 
outlets picked up on Potok’s frequent claim that “the Klan has doubled in size” and 
repeated it in conjunction with the SPLC’s claim of “a 14% jump in hate groups.” 
 The question for researchers and journalists ought to be why the SPLC’s director 
of intelligence slashed his 2013 Klan numbers in half in the first place? Ninety-one Klan 
groups the SPLC claimed existed in 2013 vanished overnight. Seventy-four Klan groups 
claimed in 2013 are not found on the 2015 Hate Map, indicating that any alleged growth 
is not a “resurgence” of old groups, but of groups that did not exist in 2013 or even 2014. 
Entire Klan groups that Potok warned of in 2013 simply disappeared, including the 
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Fraternal White Knights, (11 chapters) Knight Riders Knights of the KKK (12 chapters) 
New Empire Knights (12 chapters), and Southern Mountain Knights (5 chapters).  
Other Klan groups simply appeared out of nowhere in 2015, such as the Militant 
Knights of the KKK (20 chapters, 12 unaffiliated), Original Knight Riders Knights (15 
chapters, 12 unaffiliated), Texas Knights of the KKK (21 chapters), and Rebel Brigade 
Knights of the True Invisible Empire (6 chapters, 4 unaffiliated). Still other groups 
experienced extreme expansions or contractions, such as the Loyal White Knights, whose 
numbers collapsed dramatically from 46 chapters (32 unaffiliated) to 24 (12 unaffiliated) 
between 2013 and 2015, while the United White Knights allegedly grew from 7 chapters 
to 31 in the same period. 
Texas, in particular, experienced a dubious tenfold expansion in Klan groups in 
2015, from five to fifty, in just one year, due largely to the addition of the Texas Knights 
and the expansion of the United White Knights, with 13 Texas communities allegedly 
acquiring one chapter of each.  
Given Mark Potok’s recent pronouncements that the Klan has largely 
disintegrated, that his hate group counts are “a very rough measure” that may include 
post office boxes, or may be composed of a single individual, as noted by Laird Wilcox 
and by Mark Pitcavage of the ADL, and the wild swings in group counts from one year to 
the next, including as many as a hundred unverified, unaffiliated chapters, Potok’s 
numbers cannot be taken as hard data. 
The other category of hate group to show a significant increase in 2015 was Black 
Separatists, which allegedly grew from 111 in 2014 to 180 in 2015. The Black Separatist 
category is an aberration from the SPLC’s general message that hate groups are a largely 
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white phenomenon, and so the organization provides a somewhat reluctant justification 
for its inclusion on the list: 
Although the Southern Poverty Law Center recognizes that much black 
racism in America is, at least in part, a response to centuries of white 
racism, it believes racism must be exposed in all its forms. White groups 
espousing beliefs similar to black separatists would be considered clearly 
racist. The same criterion should be applied to all groups regardless of 
their color. 
The SPLC asserts that the growth in black hate groups in 2015 was driven in large part by 
the series of high profile killings of black suspects by white police officers, and Mark 
Potok’s numbers indicate a moderate expansion of several militant black groups, such as 
the New Black Panther Party, the Nation of Islam and the Black Liberation Riders Party. 
Nearly three-quarters of 2015’s growth stems from the addition of two new “Black 
Hebrew Israelites” groups, Israel United in Christ (33 chapters) and the Israelite School 
of Universal Practical Knowledge (11 chapters), as well as the expansion of the All Eyes 
on Egipt [sic] Bookstore chain from four to ten outlets. 
Among the reasons given for including Black Hebrew Israelites on the Hate Map 
are that many oppose integration and intermarriage, and that they “assert that blacks are 
the Biblical ‘chosen people’ of God” (Ibid). While it seems unusual for a supposedly 
secular, Progressive law center to weigh in on a purely religious claim, this stand may 
resonate with many of the SPLC’s donors.  
Another incongruity in the hate group list that goes unreported, is that by SPLC 
accounting, black hate groups make up the second largest category in the nation overall, 
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and yet when the unverified, unaffiliated groups are stripped out (Fig. 7), black hate 
groups not only significantly outnumber the Ku Klux Klan outright, but also outnumber 
all neo-Nazi, racist skinhead and white nationalist groups combined.
  
Figure 7. Black Separatists 
 
If journalists and researchers are to take the SPLC’s hate group count at face value, and if 
those groups, designated solely by the SPLC, are deemed to represent a real or imagined 
threat to society, then one cannot simply ignore the SPLC’s inconvenient conclusions that 
black groups represent the largest of these existential threats. Outside of overtly racist 
publications, no serious scholar would make that claim and to even infer such could have 
a demonstratively negative effect on SPLC fundraising efforts as it would offend a large 
portion of the donor base. Black hate groups are included in the overall Hate Map count 
to bolster the numbers, but are often quietly ignored in most hate group reporting and 
research. 
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Hate Group Counts and the Media 
The Southern Poverty Law Center has developed a robust mailing list of hundreds of 
thousands of donors and potential donors who receive regular updates, magazines and 
newsletters electronically and by direct mail. Teaching Tolerance states that it reaches 
more than 400,000 teachers a month by email. While these are impressive numbers, any 
organization reliant on external donations must continuously build its donor base through 
advertising and outreach. This advertising and outreach is especially important for an 
organization like the SPLC, whose donors are often older and elderly, and whose 
numbers predictably decline each year with the passage of time. 
 One of the best methods for reaching new donors is through the media. People 
learn of the SPLC’s latest reports on the evening news, on the car radio, in newspapers, 
or through countless online websites, blogs and social media. Mark Potok and other 
SPLC officers are routinely interviewed and widely quoted. As noted, many of these 
articles come from SPLC-produced press releases and are generally repeated verbatim 
without any vetting or verification of the accuracy of the claims being made. It may be 
understandable how private blogs and special interest outlets would willingly perpetuate 
SPLC claims that bolster their own agendas, but SPLC materials are cited by most of the 
major media sources, including the New York Times, National Public Radio, all three 
American broadcast television networks, Newsweek and Time magazines, the Wall Street 
Journal and the British Broadcasting Corporation. These established media outlets have 
a strong interest in maintaining their corporate reputations as purveyors of accurate 
information, and yet, as this paper has demonstrated, SPLC claims are often unproven 
and unsubstantiated. 
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 One of the main factors for the acceptance of SPLC press releases as factual is the 
organization’s carefully crafted reputation. Over the decades, the SPLC has billed itself 
as a non-profit civil rights organization that “fights hate and intolerance.” Every SPLC 
press release will include some reference to that effect, which is ultimately repeated by a 
trusted media outlets. As many media outlets look to each other for news content, it is not 
uncommon for one outlet to see SPLC materials cited by another trusted outlet and 
simply assume the information is reliable. Through this continuing process of repetition, 
or “compounding,” the SPLC has gradually accreted a patina of authority and expertise, 
and so its claims will go unchallenged. 
The bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on 
April 19, 1995, brought a new opportunity for the Southern Poverty Law Center to reach 
a national audience. As the largest terrorist attack on U.S. soil at that time, the bombing 
naturally drew intense scrutiny from law enforcement officials and the media. Initial 
reports suggested that the attack was the work of Islamic fundamentalists, possibly linked 
to the group that bombed the World Trade Center in 1993. When the FBI traced the rental 
truck used in the bombing  to a 27-year-old Gulf War veteran, Timothy McVeigh, who 
had no ties to radical Islam, the media were at a loss to explain the chain of events that 
led to the deaths of over 160 men, women and children. 
Criminal Justice Professor Steven Chermak described the process that followed in 
his book, Searching for a Demon: The Media Construction of the Militia Movement 
(Chermak, 2002). Though Timothy McVeigh acted as a prototypical “lone wolf,” albeit 
with the aid of at least one co-conspirator, Terry Nichols, who helped with the building of 
the truck bomb, his actions and anti-government statements in the years leading up to the 
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attack were very similar to those of several militia groups operating in the country at that 
time. McVeigh had contacts within the Militia movement, but was not a member of any 
known group. McVeigh claimed that he bombed the Murrah building in retaliation for 
increasing attacks by the federal government against its own citizens, culminating in the 
1992 standoff at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and at the raid on the Branch Davidian compound in 
Waco, Texas in 1993, both of which resulted in the deaths of innocent women and 
children (McVeigh, 2001). 
Chermak writes that with few other leads to work with the media latched on to 
McVeigh’s tenuous militia ties, and with very little information available about those 
organizations available, they turned to the same advocacy sources who had regularly 
provided information on hate groups, namely the Anti-Defamation League and the 
Southern Poverty Law Center. The SPLC maintains a list of alleged militia groups which 
is only slightly more reliable than its hate group list, as many militias have fixed 
addresses that can be verified. As previously noted, Mark Potok admitted to David 
McCrary, though, that “it is impossible for outsiders to gauge the membership of most of 
the groups,” his numbers are as much of a “rough estimate” as he noted at James 
Madison University and carry the same burden of proof as his Georgia Militia claims 
from 2011 and 2012. 
Other than the dearth of information from non-advocacy sources, Chermak cites 
several reporters who give plausible reasons why the media are willing to accept the 
SPLC’s militia numbers as readily as they do its hate groups numbers, and the same 
reasoning applies to both data sets: 
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Reporters are essentially lazy creatures, and most of their inability to get 
things right, particularly about movements that they don’t understand, 
comes from their use of self-appointed experts who also either don’t know 
what they are doing or have an agenda. It’s not some sort of conspiracy to 
not print the truth, but they have a deadline (p. 92). 
For example, in their Rolodex under militias, they have the 
Southern Poverty Law Center. The Southern Poverty Law Center 
has presented themselves over the years as the recognized experts 
in the area of militias (Ibid). [An unnamed reporter states that the 
SPLC] are good sources for me. Their research is impressive. 
Some reporters are afraid that they sensationalize too much, but 
most of their stuff they back up pretty well (p. 93). 
Much of the SPLC’s perceived expertise in the area of militias stems from a 1996 book 
produced by Morris Dees and James Corcoran (Dees, 1996). In The Gathering Storm: 
America’s Militia Threat, Dees claims his information comes directly from dozens of 
anonymous sources on the “far-right” and undercover operations “that I cannot reveal” 
(p. xiii). The 254-page book fails to include a single verifiable citation. Like the SPLC’s 
hate group count, readers are obligated to simply take Dees’ word for it. 
 Chermak further notes that reporters find advocacy group online databases, such 
as Mark Potok’s Hate Map and Mark Pitcavage’s Militia Watchdog site for the ADL, to 
be useful sources of quick, easy-to-understand information. The websites often include 
direct quotes and colorful graphics that can be easily copied and pasted into an article or 
video. The fact that the information comes from recognized sources, such as the SPLC 
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and ADL, is usually sufficient to satisfy most editors without the need to vet the claims 
(Ibid). 
 Another key factor cited by Chermak is the ease of access to the self-proclaimed 
experts. While law enforcement officials and academics may actually have more reliable 
information regarding specific groups, locating those sources is time consuming, as is 
arranging interviews. Additionally, law enforcement agencies may be circumspect in 
their responses, avoiding speculations, and academics are often too broad or too technical 
in their approach, making it difficult to condense their responses into simple sound bites 
that can be understood by wide audiences (p. 95).  
As mentioned, the SPLC has a team of skilled public relations professionals who 
specialize in breaking the organization’s claims into convenient, media-friendly 
segments. The SPLC also maintains state-of-the-art audio and video facilities that allow 
Mark Potok and other experienced spokespeople to conduct live radio and television 
interviews at a moment’s notice. This is significant when working against hard deadlines, 
as Chermak also notes, “it’s whoever calls you back the quickest that gets in there” 
(Ibid). In short, reporters and journalists can often get all the content they need from the 
SPLC without ever leaving their desks.  
At this point in his text, Chermak recounts many of the criticisms of the SPLC 
and its data collection methods, including the Montgomery Advertiser series and the 
several articles written by Ken Silverstein for Harper’s. “News of a declining Klan does 
not make for inclining donations to Morris Dees and Co.,” Chermak quotes Ken 
Silverstein, “which is why the SPLC honors nearly every nationally covered ‘hate crime’ 
with alarums full of nightmarish invocations of ‘armed Klan paramilitary forces’ and 
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“violent neo-Nazi extremists’” (Silverstein, 2000). Silverstein elsewhere notes that 
Morris Dees’ frequent use of such hyperbolic “alarums” has made his organization 
“richer than Tonga” and several other nation states (Silverstein, 2007).  
Chermak also identified concerns over the SPLC’s methodology behind its militia 
counts, especially as 
Some of the SPLC’s estimates, published in various newspapers… about 
the militia threat grew dramatically in a relatively short period of time… 
after the [Oklahoma City] bombing, the estimate grew to 224 groups in 39 
states by June, and 340 groups by September… the number grew to 950 in 
all 50 states by the end of the year (pp. 125-126). 
This alleged quadrupling of militia groups over an eight-month span presents many of the 
same credibility issues as do the SPLC’s widely fluctuating hate group counts. As 
Chermak’s colleague and frequent co-author, Joshua D. Freilich, observes, the SPLC 
does not provide any definition for the term “militia” whatsoever and “does not specify 
whether a militia/patriot group must be composed of a minimum number of individuals 
or conduct specific types of activities (aside from military training or encouraging others 
to do so) to be labeled such a group” (Freilich, 2006). With no fixed definition of the 
term and no external oversight or review of its claims, the SPLC has a free hand to set the 
number of militias, or hate groups, at any level advantageous to its organization. 
Another factor for the widespread acceptance of Southern Poverty Law Center 
hate group information by the media is bias, both as a business decision and on a personal 
level by individual journalists. While print media, such as newspapers and magazines, 
have always written with a particular audience in mind, American broadcast media were 
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held to a different standard for nearly forty years by the Federal Communication 
Commission (FCC) due to the limited number of frequencies available. Under the 
Fairness Doctrine (1949-1987), broadcasters were required to provide air time for 
competing viewpoints as a public interest and as a condition for retaining their licenses. 
FCC rules also limited the number of stations a single company could own and the 
percentage of market share it could control. While some broadcasters challenged the 
Fairness Doctrine on First Amendment rights, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 
doctrine’s constitutionality. 
When the rule was repealed in 1987, consumer advocate Ralph Nader warned in 
the New York Times that 
‘The fairness doctrine is not only constitutionally permissible, it is 
constitutionally required,’ Mr. Nader said. Its repeal, he added, means that 
broadcasters ‘can ignore crucial issues or present only one side’ of 
debates, and that news judgment will increasingly reflect a business 
orientation (Hershey, 1987).  
Although the subsequent expansion of cable television stations and the then-undreamed-
of advent of the Internet has rendered the reasoning behind the Fairness Doctrine moot, 
Nader’s prediction of a profit-driven news media has become reality. Broadcast networks 
soon adopted the targeted demographic strategies of their print counterparts and today 
networks such as MSNBC and Fox News, and their online and radio counterparts, 
unabashedly court liberal and conservative viewers, respectively. As a result, press 
releases produced by the Southern Poverty Law Center, which have always been written 
with a Progressive audience in mind, are likely to find warm reception in certain venues. 
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This is no conspiracy; it is simply the age-old business practice of selling the consumers 
what they want to buy. 
It is also worth noting that millions of Americans, including Baby Boomers and 
their parents’ generation, who lived during the years of the Fairness Doctrine, came to see 
broadcast news as fair and unbiased. For many of these now older and elderly people, 
broadcast news was delivered by “hard journalists,” such as Chet Huntley, David 
Brinkley, and Walter Cronkite, who gained the viewers’ trust. This older demographic, 
which also make up the largest segment of SPLC donors, are more likely to accept what 
they hear from the media without judging the accuracy of the information.  
Communication ethicists have noted the shift from “hard news” to “infotainment” 
over the decades following the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine that reflects much of the 
coverage of SPLC claims in the media. David Berry quotes Tom Rosenetiel’s observation 
that “intense commercial pressures on ‘serious’ news media as being responsible for 
adversely affecting reporters’ ability to seek out the ‘truth’ of various events,” and Carol 
Reuss’ claim that  
Infotainment media too often stretch the truth and give false perceptions of 
reality. To entice audiences and to fit the constraints of media time and 
space, they rely heavily on stereotypes, exaggeration, half-truths, and 
innuendo that impressionable audiences accept as reality (Berry, 2003, p. 
232). 
Journalists and commentators may also exhibit personal biases in their work, which often 
align with similar biases held by many members of their audience. One prime example of 
this behavior occurred in March 2011, as reported by Frances Martel of the Mediaite 
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blog, when MSNBC host Cenk Uygur was referencing the latest SPLC Hate Map 
numbers on the air. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. MSNBC Graphic. 
 
Uygur quotes Mark Potok’s claim that hate groups had reached a record high total of 
1,002 that year, adding, “Congratulations, America,” before citing individual numbers 
from an on-screen graphic (Fig. 8):  
‘Topping the list,’ he began, ‘[are] the Ku Klux Klan with 221 groups. 
They are followed with Neo-Nazi groups with 170 groups, and’– at this 
point Uygur stops for a beat, before ending the list with ‘that doesn’t make 
any sense’ (Martel, 2011).  
Uygur’s unwillingness, or perhaps inability, to accept the SPLC’s claims that black hate 
groups were the third largest category on the 2011 Hate Map demonstrates a definite 
personal bias on his part. This is further confirmed by the fact that, after abruptly ending 
his recitation of Hate Map numbers, Uygur immediately cut to a live interview with Mark 
Potok from the SPLC television studio in Montgomery. During the next three minutes of 
unrehearsed conversation, neither man mentions the black hate group statistic. If Cenk 
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Uygur was genuinely baffled by the inclusion of so many black groups on Potok’s Hate 
Map, he had the ultimate opportunity to question the man responsible for the hate group 
count, but did not. If Mark Potok, who witnessed the aborted recitation live, had wished 
to explain or defend his black hate group count, he did not, choosing instead to sidestep 
his own inconvenient statistic. As noted previously, Potok’s statistic becomes even more 
inconvenient when 191 unaffiliated groups are stripped out, as was done in Figure 7, 
revealing that according to the 2011 Hate Map, black hate groups outnumbered the Klan, 
neo-Nazis, and white nationalists respectively. Clearly a result that Cenk Uygur would 
find even less acceptable. 
 Bias is an innately human response, and journalists, commentators and reporters 
have other motivations, such as the need to meet hard deadlines and to appeal to a 
targeted audience for commercial purposes, so their acceptance of SPLC claims is in 
some ways logical and understandable. 
Hate Group Counts and Academic Researchers 
Academic researchers have many of the same motivations for accepting the 
Southern Poverty Law Center’s hate group numbers as do the media. Academics, 
especially those seeking tenure, are expected to engage in research and have their results 
published in the major journals for their particular field. Academic journals are under 
similar production deadlines as other serial publications and are therefore in need of new 
content on a regular basis.  
The ease of access to SPLC quotes, charts and other media that make them an 
attractive source to news venues make them equally useful to any publications that 
feature eye-catching graphics. Academics, being human, are also vulnerable to bias, and 
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in the fields that study human behavior, such as sociology, psychology and political 
science, qualitative data, which may be subject to a degree of interpretation, are often 
more acceptable than in the so-called “hard science” fields that demand measurable, 
quantifiable data, such as chemistry, physics or astronomy. 
A review of academic articles that have been based on SPLC data reveals a wide 
range of disciplines, including such journals  as Journal of Social Issues, JQ: Justice 
Quarterly, ETC: A Review of General Semantics, Journal of Psychology and the Eastern 
Economic Journal. The same repetition or compounding of SPLC data that occurs in the 
media can also be found in academia, where one researcher encounters SPLC claims in 
numerous previous studies, often originating from prestigious institutions or republished 
in the trusted media, and concludes that the data must have been verified at some earlier 
time. 
A prime example of this compounding is found in a 1999 article written by 
Jefferson and Pryor and published in the journal Economics Letters. In The Geography of 
Hate, the authors base their study on the SPLC’s “exhaustive list” of hate groups in an 
effort to determine if there is a correlation between the occurrence of a hate group in a 
given county and the level of “intolerance” within the county as a whole. While the 
article never actually defines the intolerance the researchers are investigating, they state 
unconditionally that “We assume that the presence of such groups signals intolerance,” 
from the outset, while qualifying that assumption in a footnote that reads: “If this 
assumption does not hold, of course, the point of the exercise is lost” (Jefferson, 1999, p. 
390).  
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At the conclusion of their study, Jefferson and Pryor determined that “The 
existence of a hate group in a community may reflect an extreme level of intolerance only 
by particular members of the community,” and not of the county as a whole. The authors 
further note that “In none of the statistical experiments for the other variables that we 
tried singly or in combinations did we obtain statistically significant and robust results” 
(Ibid). In short, the “intolerance” the researchers were seeking, the “point of the 
exercise,” as they put it, was not found as predicted. 
Despite the conclusions reached by Jefferson and Pryor, and their own admission 
that “We have no way of judging the quality of the list produced by the SPLC” (Ibid), 
which is to say, that “exhaustive list” upon which their entire study was based, Google 
Scholar indicates that their study was cited in 40 subsequent studies, which were 
subsequently cited in more than 1,500 other articles. Nearly all of the 40 subsequent 
articles used the Jefferson and Pryor study to bolster their claims that hate groups 
promote violence, and even terrorism, a claim that the creators of the underlying hate 
group data, the SPLC, have overtly disavowed for more than a decade. 
Nonetheless, academic articles such as Hate Groups and Hate Crime (Ryan & 
Leeson, 2011), Hate Source: White Supremacist Hate Groups and Hate Crime 
(Mullholland, 2011), Social Capital, Religion, Wal-Mart, and Hate Groups in America 
(Goetz, et al, 2012), and The Relationship between Hate Groups and Far-Right 
Ideological Violence (Adamczyk, et al, 2014), continue to cite Jefferson and Pryor and 
endorse the accuracy of SPLC-produced data. Both Goetz and Adamczyk repeat Mark 
Potok’s unsubstantiated claim of “explosive growth” in hate groups with the election of 
President Obama, giving that falsehood a patina of truth through simple repetition. 
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Other factors to consider are the methodologies employed in these studies that 
rely heavily on SPLC hate group data. Most of the articles cite the most recent SPLC 
Hate Map counts, including the unverified unaffiliated groups, which make up between 
20-25% of the total. Black hate groups, which can make up another 20% of the total 
count, are generally omitted, while obvious non-groups such as publishers, t-shirt and 
Confederate memorabilia sellers, and one-man blogs are included. Many of the reports 
include subjective descriptors such as far-right, right-wing, and extremist, without 
providing any definition for the terms. 
Another important variable to consider when comparing hate groups to hate 
crimes is the definition of hate crime. Most researchers will reference the FBI’s annual 
Uniform Crime Reporting statistics (UCR), which defines hate crimes as those “that were 
motivated in whole or in part by a bias against the victim’s perceived race, religion, 
sexual orientation, ethnicity/national origin, or disability” (FBI, n.d.). The most recent 
UCR findings as of this writing are the 2015 report, which analyzes hate crime incidents 
reported in 2014 (FBI, 2015). While no one should ever be the victim of crime 
whatsoever, and this analysis is in no way intended to diminish the serious nature or 
impact of any reported hate crime, it is worth noting that there are widely varying degrees 
of hate crimes. Some researchers will limit their studies to violent hate crimes, while 
others focus on all reported hate crimes, regardless of severity. 
The 2015 UCR hate crimes report identified 3,303 crimes against persons and 
2,317 crimes against property in 2014. Of the crimes against persons that year, four cases 
of murder/nonnegligent homicide were reported and 599 aggravated assaults. The vast 
majority of other crimes in that class (81%) were categorized as simple assaults, defined 
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by the FBI as “Assaults and attempted assaults where no weapon was used or no serious 
or aggravated injury resulted to the victim,” with more than half of the simple assaults 
described as “intimidation” (FBI, 2010). Nearly half of all hate crimes reported that year 
were crimes against property, which included potentially violent crimes such as arson 
(26) and robbery (122) as well as crimes for which the bias motive is less apparent, such 
as burglary, motor vehicle theft and “crimes against society,” which include gambling, 
prostitution and drug dealing. The vast majority of property crimes fell under vandalism 
or destruction of property (73%). 
Again, all crime is serious and should not be lightly discounted, but clearly the 
threat to society and public safety posed by four murders (out of 14,249 reported in 2014 
and 599 aggravated assaults (out of 741,291 in 2014 (FBI, 2015b)) versus 2,685 simple 
assaults (pushing, shoving, name calling, etc.) and roughly 1,700 incidents of vandalism 
must be considered when studying hate groups and hate crime. The effects of all of these 
crimes were without doubt very real to the victims who experienced them, but the vast 
difference between bias-motivated murder and simple vandalism, which even the SPLC 
concedes is largely committed by teens, must be taken into account when comparing hate 
groups to hate crimes.  
This selected application of incomplete or incompatible data, the card stacking 
device, violates Wallace’s habit of justice dictum to the same extent as when the media 
take similar ethical shortcuts to attract audiences and meet deadlines. Many of the same 
pressures and biases of the public media can be readily identified in the field of academic 
scholarship.  
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Hate Group Counts and Law Enforcement 
The last group of stakeholders to regularly rely on Southern Poverty Law Center hate 
group data is law enforcement. The SPLC routinely sends its unsolicited reports to every 
police station in the country, where the impact is minimal as even Mark Potok has 
conceded the unlikelihood of his designated hate groups committing any serious crimes:  
And I would say as a general matter, it is extremely unusual these days for 
an organization to plan and carry out a criminal act where mainly for the 
reason that they are so likely to get caught. So what we really see out there 
in terms of violence from the radical right is by and large what we would 
call lone wolves, people operating on their own or with just one or two 
partners. As opposed to, you know, being some kind of organizational 
plan (Potok, 2008).  
Still, [Potok] said the public should remain vigilant about the 
activities of hate groups, even though individuals are responsible 
for the majority of hate crimes in America (Potok, July 21, 2009). 
As Potok notes, most of the serious hate crimes committed in the U.S. have been the 
work of “lone wolves” like Timothy McVeigh and individual gunmen like Jared 
Loughner and Dylan Roof, who operate entirely below law enforcement radar until they 
act out (Mother Jones, 2016). Since lone wolves are ultimately invisible until they strike, 
the SPLC has no way to predict or track them and therefore has nothing to offer law 
enforcement or the donors beyond vague existential threats and tenuous, untested 
connections to hate groups. This overt fearmongering, while largely baseless, proves 
useful to many of the stakeholders mentioned here. 
98 
 
 
 
Immediately after Jared Loughner opened fire on a crowd in Tucson in January 
2011, killing six and injuring a dozen more, including U.S. Representative Gabrielle 
Giffords, Mark Potok made every attempt to link Loughner with a hate group, or at the 
very least, the Patriot Movement or any branch of the “Radical Right,” but with little 
success. Potok even attempted to divine a right-wing pattern from a list of favorite books 
Loughner had posted online earlier, including George Orwell’s Animal Farm and Ayn 
Rand’s We the Living, which both have strong anti-government themes. The bulk of 
Loughner’s list included children’s classics such as The Wizard of Oz, Aesop’s Fables, 
Alice in Wonderland, and Gulliver’s Travels, and many were required readings familiar 
to millions of American high school students for more than fifty years, such as the Orwell 
and Rand titles, as well as To Kill a Mockingbird, Fahrenheit 451, and The Old Man and 
the Sea (Haq, 2011). 
With so little grist for his hate group mill, Potok was forced to concede that, like 
most lone wolves, “Loughner is probably best described as a mentally ill or unstable 
person…” while speculating, “…who was influenced by the rhetoric and demonizing 
propaganda around him.” Potok, who has no psychological or psychiatric training, has no 
way of knowing what motivated Loughner, but by linking his actions to “rhetoric and 
demonizing propaganda,” Potok could still make an extremely tenuous connection to the 
“right-wing” and hate groups in SPLC fundraising materials.  
While Mark Potok’s hate group claims may have little relevance for the average 
police officer on patrol, his numbers do resonate with elected law makers and law 
enforcement officials at the highest levels. 
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 As noted earlier in this paper, executives from the Southern Poverty Law Center 
are often called to testify before Congress and have seats on several advisory panels used 
by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The credibility of the information 
provided by SPLC officials is again a product of the organization’s carefully crafted 
reputation and the compounding effect of SPLC claims that are repeated in the media and 
academic journals. Once again, because most SPLC-designated hate groups are not 
engaged in illegal activities, law enforcement has little information of its own to share, 
and so Congress and the DHS will turn to the recognized “experts” on the subject. 
 One reason for employing SPLC data is simple justification. Both Congress, who 
must justify their voting records to their constituents, especially in reelection bids, and 
large government bureaucracies, such as the DHS, who must justify their budget requests 
to Congress each year, welcome the SPLC’s data for many of the same reasons as the 
media. The information is designed to be easily assimilated, the source is highly trusted 
and the lurid nature of “hate groups” makes for interesting reading. As with most 
glittering generalities, “fighting hate” is a relatively easy way to impress the voters while 
encountering little or no opposition. The reliability of the information used is never 
questioned and the SPLC can then point to its role as trusted experts in its own 
fundraising materials. 
 Academic researchers are also part of the cycle, as many of them and their home 
institutions rely on government funding. To that end, many researchers readily employ 
SPLC hate group data in their reports as they have a strong financial motivation to write 
to the expectations of their primary audience, which is often the Department of Homeland 
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Security. Reports that suggest that hate groups pose little or no threat to society are 
unlikely to generate ongoing DHS funding down the road. 
 Nowhere is this incestuous cycle more evident than in the current research by 
Steven Chermak and Joshua Freilich, the two criminal justice professors cited in this 
paper earlier, who methodically dissected SPLC hate group and militia data in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, and found it lacking. Both academics are now researchers for the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 
based at the University of Maryland, in College Park.  
 START was launched in 2005 from a $12 million-dollar grant from the 
Department of Homeland Security, receiving additional DHS funding since then:  
Since its inception, START has furthered its mission through hundreds of 
publications in peer-reviewed academic journals, dozens of public events, 
and extensive consultations by government agencies and Congress on 
issues related to terrorism and homeland security (START, n.d.). 
Despite having found both SPLC and ADL data wanting for the several reasons 
previously cited (the subtitle of Freilich’s 2006 report reads, “Limitations of Advocacy 
Group Data and of State‐Level Studies of Paramilitary Groups”) both Chermak and 
Freilich, as well as their START colleagues Adamczyk and Gruenewald, routinely cite 
both sources in their studies, which are immediately accepted and reprinted by the 
Department of Homeland Security.   
 In such papers as their 2012 Organizational Dynamics of Far-Right Hate Groups 
in the United States, co-authors Chermak and Freilich now draw their data directly from 
the SPLC’s Intelligence Report, “which arguably provides the best listing of both violent 
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and nonviolent hate groups in the United States” (Chermak, 2013). After admitting that 
“scholars have noted problems with SPLC procedures for identifying hate incidents or 
groups,” listing their own works among those scholars, the pair justify basing their entire 
study on this unreliable data simply because “the SPLC has used the same set of 
strategies to identify hate organizations over time” (p. 202). In short, the authors are 
stating that “the data is flawed, but it is consistent.” 
They further justify their use of the problematic data by citing the SPLC’s own 
Hate Map claims that “the SPLC specifically excludes websites that are the work of a 
lone person not affiliated with a group (Ibid),” which, as this paper has repeatedly 
demonstrated, and with Mark Potok admitting that his list includes numerous anonymous 
post office boxes, is patently untrue and could easily be verified by two veteran 
researchers as Chermak and Freilich, if they chose to do so.  
Chermak and Freilich conclude their justification by stating “Thus, the sample 
includes groups that are identifiable, some that have participated in violent and/or other 
hate group activities, are comprised of two or more individuals, and seek to further an 
extremist ideology.” As noted, the SPLC provides no corroborating information on any of 
the groups it lists, with 20-25% of the count unaffiliated with any known location, such 
as the Georgia Militia. While some of the groups listed have participated in violent 
crimes, generally in the distant past, most of the groups have never committed any crimes 
and the “hate group activities” they have engaged in include publishing, marches and 
rallies, all protected free speech under the First Amendment. The statistical viability of 
any one- or two-person “hate group” to any study of the subject is dubious at best. As for 
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furthering “extremist ideology,” the term “extremist” occurs 21 times in Organizational 
Dynamics, but is never once defined. 
 Chermak and Freilich repeat this justification in several other START 
publications, which are cited by other START members, such as Adamczyk and 
Gruenewald, who also disclose START or DHS funding. The financial motivation for 
relying on SPLC data that the authors themselves have discounted cannot be ignored. As 
with academics, researchers who rely on government funding may be motivated to write 
what their customers want to hear.  
Emails written in February 2015 to all of the START authors cited in this paper, 
requesting clarification on their methodologies for vetting the SPLC numbers, have gone 
unanswered. 
The Threat to Civil Liberties 
 Undoubtedly, of all the stakeholders who unquestioningly employ SPLC hate 
group data, it is this last group, legislators and law enforcement, who present the direst 
threat to civil liberties. While the SPLC may use its own unvetted numbers to entice 
donors into giving money, and the media and academic journals to “sell copy,” those uses 
are relatively benign in the larger context. Donors and readers who accept the SPLC’s 
claims at face value without verifying those claims have no one to blame but themselves 
and may be written off with a cavalier claim of caveat emptor, or “a fool and his money.” 
This is not the case with law enforcement, though. 
 In recent years, the terms “extremist” and “domestic terrorist” have entered the 
SPLC’s lexicon with “right-wing” and “far-right,” with that organization providing no 
definition of any of the terms given whatsoever. While the “hate group” label may carry a 
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social stigma (the term, while meaningless, is a shaming tool, by design), being 
designated an “extremist” or “terrorist” by a private advocacy group can inevitably incur 
the interest of Homeland Security and other law enforcement agencies, who are mandated 
to follow all suspicious leads. In these cases, the Bill of Rights that prevents the SPLC 
from “destroying” all of the hate groups on its list may offer little protection in the 
expedient name of “security.”  
Lawmakers may also be swayed by “extremist” fearmongering and attempt to 
abrogate American’s civil rights through legislation, as occurred under the USA 
PATRIOT act within weeks of the September 11 terrorist attacks. The Act, and its 
Orwellian acronym, “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism,” had been conceived years before 
the al Qaeda attack in anticipation for just such an emergency by neo-Conservative 
entities outside the government at the time (US DOJ, n.d.). The act was signed into law a 
mere seven weeks after the attack by then-President George W. Bush, with very little 
debate and almost no opposition in Congress.  
In many ways, the USA PATRIOT Act mirrored the drastic assault on civil 
liberties committed by the Nazis in their infamous “Decree of the Reich President for the 
Protection of People and State,” which followed the Reichstag Fire in 1933 and similarly 
gutted many constitutionally protected civil rights. In the name of “security,” the Nazis 
passed legislation to 
Restrict the rights of personal freedom [habeas corpus], freedom of 
(opinion) expression, including the freedom of the press, the freedom to 
organize and assemble, the privacy of postal, telegraphic and telephonic 
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communications. Warrants for house searches, orders for confiscations as 
well as restrictions on property, are also permissible beyond the legal 
limits otherwise prescribed (GHDI, n.d.). 
 The USA PATRIOT Act accomplished many of the same goals, also in the name of 
“security.” 
 One glaring example of the dangers of law enforcement relying on advocacy 
group information occurred in 2009, when the Missouri Information Analysis Center 
(MIAC), a DHS-created “fusion center” designed to disseminate DHS information to 
local law enforcement agencies, issued a report to the Missouri State Highway Patrol, 
warning of the dangers of “The Modern Militia Movement” (MIAC, 2009). 
 While the Southern Poverty Law Center is never mentioned as a source in the 
“MIAC Report,” (though it is listed as a potential target) many sections of the text are 
lifted directly from SPLC publications, verbatim. The report advises the Highway Patrol 
that a good way to identify potential militia members is by their display of the yellow, 
“Don’t Tread on Me” Gadsden flag. Chillingly, the report claims that 
Militia members most commonly associate with 3rd [sic] party political 
groups. It is not uncommon for militia members to display Constitutional 
Party, Campaign for Liberty, or Libertarian material. These members are 
usually supporters of former Presidential Candidate: [sic] Ron Paul, Chuck 
Baldwin, and Bob Barr. 
The ethical ramifications of any law enforcement agency warning its officers to be on the 
lookout for third party political materials that might lead them to “violent extremists” 
cannot be underestimated. Not only does this violate the most fundamental First 
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Amendment rights, it stifles legitimate criticism of elected government and chills 
protected political activity.  
When the MIAC Report was leaked to the press, the resulting uproar forced 
Missouri Governor Jay Nixon to publicly apologize to Paul, Baldwin, and Barr, but 
Nixon did not repudiate the document. Although this report was ultimately uncovered 
and exposed, it is purely a matter of speculation as to how many similar documents are 
currently circulating among law enforcement agencies. One similar document is Goetz’s 
study, Social Capital, Religion, Wal-Mart, and Hate Groups in America, which was 
published in the Social Science Quarterly in April, 2012 and immediately reprinted by 
the Homeland Security News Wire under the heading, “Formation of Hate Groups 
Associated with Big-Box Stores” (Homeland, 2012). 
Citing Jefferson and Pryor, Goetz’s study claims a direct connection between the 
number of Wal-Mart* stores in any given county in 1998 and the number of hate groups 
listed on the SPLC’s Hate Map for 2007 (* The company’s brand name was hyphenated 
until 2008, when it was shortened to Walmart). The report, which neglects to identify 
whether black hate groups were included or how counties were assigned to unaffiliated 
hate groups with no given location, posits that, through the use of the slogan “Save 
Money, Live Better,” “Wal-Mart, with its media campaigns emphasizing concepts central 
to the Protestant ethic, may inadvertently trigger hate in individuals particularly 
susceptible to this kind of priming” (p. 389).  
Goetz concludes that his team did identify a tenuous correlation between Wal-
Mart stores in 1998 and SPLC-designated hate groups in 2007, coming to the ethically 
ambiguous conclusion that 
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[Our] discovery of an association between Wal-Mart locations and hate 
groups could lead the corporation’s foundation to play a larger role in 
supporting the types of local groups that enhance the social capital index 
used in our analysis (p. 391). 
 This line of reasoning crosses the boundary from scholarly research to agenda-driven 
advocacy and seems designed to influence Wal-Mart’s philanthropic endeavors by 
linking the corporation to the formation of hate groups using flawed SPLC data. Elise 
Springer refers to this practice as “moral sociology,” noting that “this interpretive 
approach abandons the ideal of disengaged observation in favor of a practically directed 
pattern of attention (p. 166)” (Springer, 2013). 
Equally as alarming, investigative journalist Glenn Greenwald has tracked a 
steady sea change in the relationship between the media and government evolving 
through both the Bush and the Obama Administrations. The Fourth Estate mindset that 
gave rise to journalists like Edward R. Murrow, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, 
reporters who were willing to confront the government and other powerful sectors of 
society to uncover scandal and wrongdoing, has morphed into a more collegial, collusive 
relationship.  
Greenwald, who was the primary conduit for the release of thousands of classified 
National Security Administration (NSA) documents obtained by whistleblower Edward 
Snowden in 2013, notes that the financial and class differences that traditionally existed 
between the press and the powerful have eroded:  
This identification of the establishment media with the government is 
cemented by various factors, one of them being socioeconomic. Many of 
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the influential journalists in the United States are now multimillionaires. 
They live in the same neighborhoods as the political figures and financial 
elites over which they ostensibly serve as watchdogs. They attend the 
same functions, they have the same circles of friends and associates, their 
children go to the same elite private schools (Greenwald, p. 234). 
Greenwald writes that these relationships are part of the reason  so many in the media and 
in government make lateral career moves into each other’s professions, citing journalists 
who have been appointed to government positions and government officials such as 
Obama aides David Axelrod and Robert Gibbs, who have signed lucrative media 
contracts: 
The switch is so streamlined precisely because the personnel still serve the 
same interests. Rich, famous, insider journalists do not want to subvert the 
status quo that so lavishly rewards them. Like all courtiers, they are eager 
to defend the system that vests them with their privileges and 
contemptuous of anyone who challenges that system (p. 235). 
The Southern Poverty Law Center is now part of that system. It enjoys unfettered, 
unchallenged “go-to” access to nearly all of the major media outlets in the U.S., which 
then diffuses down into hundreds of smaller local and international venues. Many in the 
government, as laid out in Section VIII of this paper, accept the SPLC as “experts” and 
find their hate group materials to be useful in justifying their work, and therefore their 
continued funding. The SPLC benefits by citing the many media and government reports 
based on SPLC data in its fundraising materials. It is a collusive, incestuous cycle that 
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creates a demonstrable financial incentive for all three participants to maintain the status 
quo.  
The “Trump Effect” and the 2016 Presidential Election 
One of the Southern Poverty Law Center’s most recent card stacking campaigns, as of 
this writing, is based on the run-up to and final results of the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election. As a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, the SPLC is strictly prohibited by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from directly participating in ongoing election 
campaigns, at the risk of losing its tax-exempt status. 
Under the Internal Revenue Code, all section 501(c)(3) organizations are 
absolutely prohibited from directly or indirectly participating in, or intervening in, 
any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for 
elective public office.  
Contributions to political campaign funds or public statements of position 
(verbal or written) made on behalf of the organization in favor of or in 
opposition to any candidate for public office clearly violate the prohibition 
against political campaign activity. Violating this prohibition may result in 
denial or revocation of tax-exempt status and the imposition of certain 
excise taxes (IRS, Restriction, n.d.). 
In the spring of 2016, as a string of primary election wins brought conservative Donald 
Trump’s nomination as the Republican Party’s candidate ever closer, the SPLC released a 
series of reports that cast Trump in a distinctly negative light. The February 18 issue of 
the SPLC’s Intelligence Report featured Trump on the cover of its annual Year in Hate 
and Extremism issue. In the photo montage, an open-mouthed Trump is surrounded by 
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what the report’s author, Mark Potok, describes as “antigovernment militiamen, white 
supremacists, abortion foes, domestic Islamist radicals, neo-Nazis and lovers of the 
Confederate battle flag,” with an oversized image of Trump towering, literally, head and 
shoulders above the rest (SPLC, Intelligence Report, 2016). The words “Hate and 
Extremism” in bold red letters and then-accused Charleston, SC, shooter Dylan Roof and 
a Confederate flag frame the candidate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Spring 2016 Intelligence Report 
While Donald Trump had made, and continues to make, numerous controversial 
statements and negative remarks about women, minorities, and immigration, the ham-
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fisted imagery of the cover photo and Potok’ s guilt-by-association claims in the cover 
story of, “glowing endorsements from white nationalist leaders such as Jared Taylor and 
former Klansman David Duke,” clearly violated the IRS proscriptions against 
“statements of position” against a candidate in an ongoing political election. 
 An April 13, 2016, report continued the anti-Trump theme. The Trump Effect: The 
Impact of the Presidential Campaign on Our Nation's Schools, written by the SPLC’s 
Teaching Tolerance Director, Maureen Costello, opens with the emotionally charged and 
highly improbable claim that “Every student, from preschoolers up through high school, 
is aware of the tone, rhetoric and catch-phrases of this particular campaign season (p. 6).” 
Costello claimed that the negative comments issuing from the televised primary debates 
were traumatizing students across the nation on a grand scale. 
Even native-born African-American children, whose families arrived before the 
American Revolution, ask about being sent back to Africa. Others, especially 
younger students, have worries that are the stuff of nightmares, like a return to 
slavery or being rounded up and put into camps (Costello, p. 7). 
Costello based her claims on a survey produced by Teaching Tolerance that asked 
educators if they had noticed an increase in bullying or other negative behavior in their 
classrooms during the primaries. The result was allegedly 2,000 responses, which 
provided 5,000 comments, the vast majority of which echoed Costello’s opening claims 
of widespread student anxiety from kindergarten through high school. The mainstream 
media and the Blogosphere picked up on the Trump Effect and repeated its findings 
widely. 
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 Most of the commentators either missed or deliberately ignored the disclaimer on 
the report that stated 
Our survey of approximately 2,000 K-12 teachers was not scientific. Our email 
subscribers and those who visit our website are not a random sample of teachers 
nationally, and those who chose to respond to our survey are likely to be those 
who are most concerned about the impact of the presidential campaign on their 
students and schools (p. 4). 
Not only were all of the responses, as well as the 5,000 accompanying comments, 
anonymous, Costello couldn’t even verify that “those who visit our website” were even 
teachers. The same report states that Teaching Tolerance reaches 400,000 teachers a 
month, and yet the entire report was based on only 2,000 anonymous and completely 
anecdotal responses. Instead of reporting that the SPLC had received 2,000 non-random 
replies from unverified sources, most media accounts stated that “the SPLC surveyed 
2,000 teachers,” which is entirely inaccurate and misleading. 
 The November 9, 2016, election of Donald Trump officially ended the 
presidential campaign and so the IRS prohibition against attacking political candidates 
expired. Two days later, on November 11, the SPLC reported that it had received reports 
“of over 200 incidents of election-related harassment and intimidation across the 
country” (the actual count was 201). The report stated that it had learned of these 
“incidents” by “pulling from news reports, social media, and direct submissions at the 
[SPLC] website.” The article also included the disclaimer that “Every incident could not 
be immediately independently verified” (SPLC, Over 200 Incidents, Nov. 11, 2016). 
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The report included alleged quotes from anonymous, heart-rending anecdotes 
such as  
My 12 year old [sic] daughter is African American. A boy approached her and 
said, “now that Trump is president, I'm going to shoot you and all the blacks I can 
find.” We reported it to the school who followed up with my daughter and the boy 
appropriately. 
While it is quite likely that hurtful, stupid things were said in many quarters during the 
election campaign, and long before it, attributing the alleged immature comments of fifth 
graders is hardly indicative of “election-related intimidation,” but the SPLC has a long 
history of fearmongering through such anecdotal, unverified “incidents.” Immediately 
after Barack Obama was elected in 2008, Mark Potok was making the media rounds and 
warning of “racist backlash” after hearing reports of several 7- and 8-year-olds chanting 
“Assassinate Obama!” on an Idaho school bus (Potok, November 25, 2008). Taken at 
face value, such schoolyard inanities are easily discounted, but when included in polished 
SPLC “intelligence reports,” the claims resonate with the organization’s primary 
audiences. 
  It is important to note that most of the incidents reported to the SPLC came in via 
an anonymous web page set up on the organization’s website. Anyone could make a report 
by simply providing a first name and no other corroborating information. By November 
14, the SPLC was reporting 437 incidents, complete with bar graph breakdowns of 
incident type and location, but the actual reports were not made available for journalists to 
verify. More anonymous quotes followed:  
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A Latina woman in Texas reported: I was walking my baby at my neighborhood 
park and a truck drove by with a male driving and a female passenger. The female 
yelled “white power” at us as they drove by and then sped away. 
This update, and ones that followed, included the disclaimer “These incidents, aside from 
news reports, are largely anecdotal. The SPLC did follow up with a majority of user 
submissions in an effort to confirm reports.” The article did not disclose how the 
organization followed up on anonymous, anecdotal reports. The December 16 update, 
which claimed a new total of 1,094 incidents noted that “The SPLC made every effort to 
verify each report, but many included in the count remain anecdotal,” but again failed to 
produce the reports or provide a methodology for verifying the claims. 
 The Ten Days After report opens with a description of a nationally publicized 
incident where a historically black church in Greenville, Mississippi, had been burned by 
arsonists and the words “Vote Trump” spray painted on the side of the building. “The 
incident was just a harbinger of what has become a national outbreak of hate, as white 
supremacists celebrate Donald Trump’s victory,” the report claims (p. 2). The SPLC’s 
attempt to link an alleged “national outbreak of hate” to the election, and more 
importantly, to the highly controversial president-elect, simply does not stand up to 
methodological scrutiny. 
 To begin with, the SPLC provides no benchmark with which to compare the 
“national outbreak” beyond linking it to the November 9 election. An inspection of the 
anonymous #ReportHate intake webpage indicates that the page was created on 
November 8 and provides no background measure of alleged incidents in the months 
leading up to the election or even one year earlier. When the starting point is zero, any 
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increase whatsoever can be parlayed into an “outbreak.” If one incident was reported on 
November 9 and a second on November 10, the SPLC could rightfully claim “a 100% 
increase in reported hate incidents” with complete mathematical accuracy. The carefully-
worded references to “post-election” incidents and “aftermath” are purely calendrical. 
The anecdotes are post-election merely because the SPLC allegedly did not begin to 
collect them until after the election. “Aftermath” generally refers to the consequences of a 
disaster, which would no doubt resonate with several SPLC audiences (SPLC, Ten Days 
After).  
It is also important to note that while the SPLC refers specifically to “hate 
incidents,” many in social media and even in the mainstream media transformed that 
descriptor to “hate crimes,” which the SPLC never claims directly. Ten Days After does 
claim that the report “almost certainly represents a small fraction of the actual number of 
election-related hate incidents,” citing a Bureau of Justice Statistics report on 
underreporting of actual hate crimes, but the SPLC is careful not to label the “harassment 
and intimidation” referenced in the subtitle of the Ten Days After report as definite hate 
crimes (p. 5). 
Ten Days After states that the 867 alleged incidents were collected from two 
sources, “submissions to the #ReportHate page on the SPLC website and media 
accounts,” but does not indicate how many reports came from either source. Actual 
reports made to the media, including hoaxes, appear to make up a small fraction of the 
overall count, certainly no more than 3- to 5- percent of the total. The paper disclaims 
that “it was not possible to confirm the veracity of all reports,” but makes no indication of 
how many reports could be verified (Ibid).  
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The December 16 update notes that 13 of the incidents reported in the media were 
proven hoaxes and removed them from the count, and promised that any future false 
reports would likewise be removed. On December 21, Andrew McClinton, an African-
American and congregation member of the burned Mississippi church identified as a 
“harbinger of hate” in the opening lines of the Ten Days After report, was arrested and 
charged with the arson attack on that church, and with the “Vote Trump” graffiti (CBS 
News, December 21, 2016). The SPLC has yet to remove the incident from its list, as of 
this writing, possibly because, if McClinton is found guilty, the arson attack would 
represent one of the few verifiable “election-related” incidents. 
 On November 28, 2016, the SPLC doubled down on its pre-election “Trump 
Effect” report by stating that Teaching Tolerance had administered a second survey in the 
days after the election, this time claiming that “Over 10,000 teachers, counselors, 
administrators and others who work in schools have responded.” The update repeated all 
of the claims of the earlier report, only on a far larger scale, and now, free from the IRS 
restrictions, the organization directly attributed the alleged incidents to Donald Trump. 
“Since Trump was elected, media have been awash in reports of hate incidents around the 
nation, including at schools” (SPLC, Trump Effect, November 28, 2016). 
 The update was based on the same anonymous reply structure as the previous 
report, only this time, as if stung by criticism of its earlier methodology, the final 
question on the survey asked respondents if they would be willing to share their contact 
information upon request. The report claimed that 1,500 “educators” (again, no 
mechanism was in place to verify that the respondents were actual teachers) responded in 
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the affirmative, yet no means of obtaining the information, or of seeing any of the 10,000 
alleged responses was provided. 
 Instead, the update includes more of the same disturbing, unverified and 
anonymous anecdotes designed to resonate with readers, all attributed to anonymous 
educators:  
One Muslim girl clung to her kindergarten teacher on November 9 and asked, 
“Are they going to do anything to me? Am I safe?” – Early Childhood Teacher, 
Tennessee 
Students were suicidal, without hope. Fights, disrespect have increased as well. – 
Middle School Counselor, Florida. 
Multi-racial children were telling Hispanic children they were going back to 
Mexico and their parents were first. Fifth-grade boys were fighting in the 
bathroom because they found out who voted for Trump in the mock election at 
school. A lesbian student’s mother was telling her that life as we knew it was 
over, and she was quite distraught about her mother. Children are very worried 
about being deported or killed. – Elementary Counselor, Illinois (pp. 8-9). 
Again, it is not the intent of this paper to downplay or dismiss the possible reactions of 
students to the results of the election, especially Muslim and undocumented students, in 
light of Donald Trump’s inflammatory campaign rhetoric. The purpose of this section is 
to move beyond the underlying sentimentality of entirely unverified, anecdotal claims by 
the SPLC and evaluate the reliability of such based on the evidence at hand. Serious 
claims such as these require serious proof, which the Southern Poverty Law Center has 
yet to provide, as of this writing. 
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 The SPLC included the same “unscientific” disclaimer in the updated report, 
though only on its website and not in the actual report itself: 
The results of this survey are not scientific. The respondents were not selected in 
a manner to ensure a representative sample; those who responded may have been 
more likely to perceive problems than those who did not. 
While the disclaimer ought to immediately dispel any question regarding the reliability or 
objectivity of the survey’s alleged results, the SPLC attempted to gloss over the negative 
aspects by noting: 
But it is the largest collection of educator responses that has been collected; the 
tremendous number of responses as well as the overwhelming confirmation of 
what has been anecdotally reported in the media cannot be ignored or dismissed. 
Arguing that the alleged results are somehow valid simply because they are part of a very 
large collection of reports, none of which have been produced for public scrutiny to date, 
is false logic. Associating these unsubstantiated claims with the comparatively far smaller 
sample reported in the media is a straw man argument that suggests that the SPLC’s 
anecdotal claims are on a par with legitimate news reports of incidents that are under 
actual investigation by authorities.  
It should also be noted that in several of the more dramatic cases actually reported 
in the media, such as the case of the arson attack on the historically black church in 
Greenville, Mississippi, or at least two cases of Muslim women charging that pro-Trump 
supporters, who are invariably white males, assaulted them and pulled off their hijab head 
scarves, police investigations have determined that the suspects were minorities 
themselves or the claims were entirely falsified.  
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 Journalists and researchers need to remain aware of the possibility of activists 
and outright hoaxers attempting to implicate others for political purposes. Laird Wilcox 
noted: 
It’s no great surprise that a bright, socially-conscious individual would realize 
quite on his or her own that there’s nothing like some racist graffiti or some other 
“hate crime” to invigorate the militants, and what the hell, it’s for a good cause - 
right? Americans are not known for their ability to defer gratification for long. 
Hence, the racist or anti-Semitic hoax. It’s as easy as apple pie. 
What I see happening with hoaxes is a kind of “market” process: the 
frequency of hoaxes increases with their utility in accomplishing desired 
ends. When the “market” or payoff for victimization goes up, the 
temptation to create victimization where none exists is very strong and the 
temptation to exaggerate minor cases of alleged victimization is even 
stronger. Conversely, as the number of hoaxes increases (assuming they 
are reported) a greater skepticism toward unproven and marginal 
victimization claims will probably increase as well, and hoaxes will 
become less effective. It’s pretty much a matter of supply and demand 
(Wilcox, 1994, p. 2). 
When hoaxes reported to the police or media are uncovered, the consequences for the 
perpetrator may range from public humiliation to actual jail time, and so there is a certain 
level of risk in making false reports at that level. The SPLC’s anonymous reporting 
webpages remove all risk for those who are “more likely to perceive problems” and the 
“the temptation to create victimization where none exists” is arguably greatly increased. 
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For many Americans, the rancorous 2016 elections undoubtedly provided the “market” 
described by Wilcox. Heart-tugging tales of terrified kindergarteners and distraught 
elementary school lesbians will resonate with donors and other stakeholders, but unless 
the SPLC is able and willing to provide any proof that the exchanges actually took place, 
and from someone more identifiable than “Elementary School Teacher, Illinois” 
reporting in on an anonymous webpage, there is no methodologically sound reason to 
accept any of the organization’s “Trump Effect” claims as valid.  
This is not hard data, and yet numerous media reports since the election have 
listed the Southern Poverty Law Center as the sole- or co-beneficiary of grassroots 
fundraising events created by local artists and musicians, pubs and restaurants, as well as 
immigrant and LGBT social groups. There is no way of telling how many individual 
donors will be moved to make or increase their donations to the SPLC based on the 
unverified anecdotes related in the Trump Effect and Ten Days After. Once again, the 
organization realizes financial gain through the promulgation of baseless claims. 
Ethical Issues 
In 1994, the “Hate Industry” described by Laird Wilcox was still relatively small, 
centered chiefly around the claims of the SPLC and Anti-Defamation League, but as their 
initial success among their own dedicated and highly defined donor groups grew, so did 
their reputations and influence. Nothing spawns imitation like success and more 
advocacy groups followed. Many of the groups have addressed legitimate societal 
problems, and it should be noted that the SPLC has and continues to tackle cases of overt 
racial, gender and identity based discrimination.  
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The SPLC has been extremely selective in choosing the cases it pursues, such as 
ignoring the blatant anti-gay policies of the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) for more than 
a decade. In 1998, the BSA banned gay scouts and scout leaders from its organization 
and restated its commitment to exclude gays from its ranks in 2002: 
The BSA reaffirmed its view that an avowed homosexual cannot serve as 
a role model for the traditional moral values espoused in the Scout Oath 
and Law and that these values cannot be subject to local option choices 
(BSA, 2002). 
It would be difficult to provide a more demonstrative example of one group “attacking or 
maligning” another group “for its immutable characteristics” than the Boy Scouts’ claim 
that all “avowed homosexuals” lack the moral values to be scouts. And yet, despite the 
fact that the BSA is charged with molding the minds and shaping the characters of 
millions of American boys, the SPLC never mentioned the BSA’s discriminatory policies 
on its website and never once designated the organization as a “hate group.” 
Twelve years ago, the Southern Poverty Law Center stopped participating 
in the Montgomery, Ala., United Way campaign because the organization 
chose to fund the Boy Scouts of America despite its policy of excluding 
LGBT people from its ranks (Levin, 2012). 
The press release notes that other than quietly dropping out of the Montgomery United 
Way campaign the SPLC did nothing more to address the issue. Rather than turn the 
SPLC’s formidable public opinion spotlight on the BSA back in 1998, Levin gently 
chastised the organization in the softest possible terms, such as claiming that the BSA 
“embraces anti-LGBT prejudices” rather than engaging in hate, and at one point even 
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apologized for the BSA’s blatant discrimination by stating, “Of course, the Boy Scouts of 
America doesn’t intend to encourage bigotry. But such policies can have that effect.” In 
2000, the BSA took its case to the U.S. Supreme Court to affirm that it had a 
constitutional right as a private organization to discriminate against any potential 
applicant (Boy Scouts of America v. Dale). It would be difficult to imagine a more 
intentional desire to “encourage bigotry” than taking one’s case to the Supreme Court. 
The term “hate group” never appears in Levin’s press release. 
 Within two years, Levin would step back from what little criticism his 
2012 press release did provide. In a 2014 article posted on the MSNBC website, 
Levin stated 
We don’t list the Boy Scouts (as a hate group),” said Levin. “We only do 
that if we have a group that’s propagating known falsehoods associated 
with a particular person or group – in this case, the LGBT community. 
The Boy Scouts haven’t really done that” (Margolin, 2014). 
If a blanket statement that all “avowed homosexuals” lack the moral values to be in the 
Boy Scouts isn’t “propagating falsehoods” against the LGBT community, one has to 
wonder it would take for a group to cross the SPLC’s hate group threshold? Once again, 
the SPLC’s application of its hate group designation is inconsistent and subjective.  
Questionable Fundraising Practices 
The Southern Poverty Law Center’s financial records indicate that its advancement 
department, which is largely in charge of public relations and fundraising, accounts for 
nearly half of the organization’s annual expenses, after joint costs have been factored in. 
This team of experienced professionals, led by direct mail marketing expert Morris Dees, 
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employs a number of time-tested fundraising techniques to persuade existing donors to 
give again and to attract new donors as well. Some of these common methods, while 
entirely legal and widely practiced by many nonprofits, are ethically dubious nonetheless, 
as they often play on donors’ emotions and exploit the memory of people who were at the 
center of the Civil Rights Movement. 
One example of these fundraising techniques, laden with glittering generalities, 
involves the SPLC’s “Wall of Tolerance,” a large flat screen display located at the 
organization’s headquarters in Montgomery. As described on the SPLC website    
The Wall of Tolerance digitally displays the names of more than half a 
million people who have pledged to take a stand against hate and work for 
justice and tolerance in their daily lives. Their names flow continuously 
down the 20-by-40 foot wall within the Civil Rights Memorial Center in 
Montgomery, Alabama (SPLC, n.d.).  
Those honored on the wall received an ornate certificate of appreciation signed by Morris 
Dees and Rosa Parks, with author Toni Morrison co-signing after Ms. Parks’ death in 
2005.  
My subsequent investigation into the Wall of Tolerance revealed several postings 
in online discussion groups by people active in nonprofit causes who had received 
certificates of appreciation without ever having heard of the program. Some had never 
donated to the Southern Poverty Law Center and had certainly never taken any pledge 
(Allenberg, 2006). That pledge invokes the memory of the many victims of the Civil 
Rights Movement: 
123 
 
 
 
By placing my name on the Wall of Tolerance, I pledge to take a stand 
against hate, injustice and intolerance. I will work in my daily life for 
justice, equality and human rights – the ideals for which the Civil Rights 
martyrs died.  
Several recipients mentioned that they believe the SPLC obtained their information from 
mailing lists of other nonprofit organizations, which are routinely sold and traded among 
such groups. The certificate of appreciation, which arrived with packs of return mail 
labels bearing the recipient’s mailing address, one of the oldest fundraising solicitation 
techniques known, was sent solely to initiate a first-time donation to the SPLC, not to 
commemorate a previous donation. Ironically, among the baffled recipients was Marcus 
Epstein, whom the SPLC has labeled a “white supremacist” in a full article against 
Epstein on its website (SPLC, Extremist Group Announces, October 8, 2008). Clearly, if 
the allegations are true, Mr. Epstein is highly unlikely to be an SPLC donor or to embrace 
“the ideals for which the Civil Rights martyrs died” (Epstein, 2008).  
 The Wall of Tolerance campaign drew high praise, as early as 2009, from SOFII, 
the Showcase of Fundraising Innovation and Inspiration, a public relations think tank:  
The Southern Poverty Law Center, who launched this campaign, is a 
hugely impressive organization with a long and well-deserved reputation 
for effective donor development. Though we don’t have the results, we 
think we can presume that this direct mail capital appeal must have 
worked really very well. 
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This is one of the most moving and long-lasting donor involvement 
campaigns in the USA and represents some of the best that the 
direct marketer’s art can produce (SOFII, 2009). 
The Wall of Tolerance appears to be little more than a marketing ploy directed at anyone 
with a current postal address. As such, the ethical considerations of invoking the 
memories of the victims of racist violence and exploiting the fame of civil rights icon 
Rosa Parks and author Toni Morrison are great. Morris Dees may be a master of “the 
direct marketer’s art,” but with his repeated use of the transfer technique, as he did with 
Julian Bond, he has proven himself a master of the propagandist’s art as well, though all 
of his celebrity endorsers have been willing participants in the process.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Stand Strong Against Hate map 
125 
 
 
 
Another successful bandwagon fundraising campaign that ran concurrently with the Wall 
of Tolerance until 2014, was the SPLC’s interactive “Stand Strong Against Hate” map 
found on the organization’s website.   
The accompanying text informed visitors that  
The dots on the map above represent the organized hate groups operating in our 
country. Is there hate in your state? As the ranks of hate swell, people of goodwill 
must stand up and be counted. 
Add yourself to our map as a voice for tolerance. Join people across the 
nation who are standing strong against the hate, racism, and intolerance 
infecting our communities, schools and political debate. At the Southern 
Poverty Law Center, we track and expose the activities of hate groups in 
the United States and use innovative legal strategies to put them out of 
business. Thank you for standing strong against hate. 
In order to “stand strong against hate,” visitors can add a digital pinhead to the map 
bearing their first name and last initial, located in the vicinity of their home town, by 
providing the SPLC with their full name, telephone number, street and email addresses. 
While the web page makes no mention of how exactly providing one’s personal contact 
information “stood strong” or “fought hate,” the information provided was no doubt of 
great interest to the SPLC’s fundraising department. 
 In August 2015, six weeks after the murder of nine African Americans in a 
Charleston, SC, church, the SPLC launched its “Erasing Hate” campaign. Photographs of 
Dylann Roof, the then-suspect in the murder, surfaced showing Roof posing with a small 
Confederate battle flag and a handgun, leading the SPLC to set out “to identify and erase 
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government-sanctioned symbols of the Confederacy across the country” (SPLC, SPLC 
Launches, August, 01, 2015).  
The online campaign asked readers to report the location of public buildings, 
streets, schools and other institutions named for people connected with the Confederacy, 
which would allow the SPLC to spotlight the entities and put pressure on the responsible 
municipalities to rename them. While the SPLC is well within its rights to undertake the 
campaign, as many people are genuinely offended by the Confederate references, once 
again, a name and email address was required to make a report. If the true purpose of the 
campaign was simply to identify every street and school named for Robert E. Lee, etc., 
then a simple text response box would be adequate. In fact, because these institutions are 
public they are already listed on multiple state, local and federal databases.  
“Erasing Hate” was arguably a way to exploit the Charleston murders to gain 
potential donor information. An April 2016 update revealed that the names of 1,503 
“symbols of the Confederacy” were collected by the campaign, but no mention of any 
action taken by the SPLC was given (SPLC, Whose Heritage? April, 21, 2016). It should 
also logically follow that, if the intent of the campaign was to remove or rename symbols 
“representing racism, slavery and the country’s long history of oppression of African 
Americans,” that those efforts should apply to those who supported and profited from 
slavery since the nation’s founding as well. SPLC headquarters are located on 
Washington Avenue, in Montgomery, a street named for a major slave owner and 
arguably the man bearing huge responsibility for institutionalizing chattel slavery for the 
first four score and seven years of the nation’s existence. At least twelve U.S. presidents 
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owned slaves, including Ulysses Grant, as did numerous lesser office holders. If the 
“Erase Hate” campaign is sincere, it ought to apply across the board. 
One final example of ethically challenged marketing by the Southern Poverty 
Law Center involves its use of third-party telemarketers to canvass for new, first-time 
donors. Between 2012 and 2014, third-party telemarketers raised $5,156,337 over the 
telephone on behalf of the SPLC. Tax records indicate that the telemarketers were 
actually paid $5,750,295 for the services, resulting in a net loss of $593,958. This means 
that not only did the telemarketers keep all of the money donated to the SPLC by first 
time donors, but they also received nearly $600,000 sent in by existing donors who 
believed that they too were “fighting hate” with their donations. 
One company in particular, Grassroots Campaigns, from Boston, has consistently 
received far more in fees than it has raised in donations. In 2015, Grassroots was paid 
more than $2 million to raise only $757,000, for a net loss of over $1.3 million. Other 
telemarketers, such as Telefund and Harris Marketing, are allowed to keep substantial 
portions of every dollar they receive on behalf of the SPLC, with Telefund receiving 64% 
to 75% percent and Harris trimming up to 90% of the donations it receives. In short, all 
of the $1,514,365 raised by the three telemarketers in 2015 stayed with the telemarketers 
as well as an additional $969,474 taken from existing donor coffers (SPLC, IRS Form 
990, 2016, p. 40). 
Donors have a responsibility to ask questions before giving money, such as 
determining how much of their donation will actually reach the nonprofit in question. 
Most donors will not ask, believing that all of their donation is going toward doing good, 
or “fighting hate” as in the case of the SPLC. How many people are affected by such 
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practices? The SPLC paid their telemarketers $2,483,839 in 2015. At the $100 level, 
which seems high for first time donors, 24,839 well-meaning people were deceived by 
omission. At a more reasonable $25 donation level, every dollar given by more than 
99,000 new and existing SPLC donors went directly to the telemarketers without donors’ 
knowledge. Even fewer donors realize that the SPLC has cash reserves on hand in excess 
of $300 million.  
Jacques Ellul on the Efficacy of Propaganda 
A final word on how so much of the Southern Poverty Law Center’s claims fit into 
modern propaganda models and why so many people, including well-educated 
professionals, are willing to accept the SPLC’s claims without question. One of the most 
influential writers on the study of propaganda was the French sociologist and philosopher 
Jacques Ellul (1912-1994).  Randal Marlin writes: 
There is probably no other thinker who has thought as deeply about propaganda in 
all its dimensions and ramifications as Jacques Ellul. What sets him apart from 
other analysis is his rare if not unique combination of expertise in history, law, 
and political science, along with careful study of biblical and Marxist writings 
(Marlin, p. 23). 
Ellul’s seminal 1962 book, Propagandes, continues to influence propaganda analysis 
decades later. Translated into English as Propaganda: the formation of men's attitudes, 
Ellul’s original French title alludes to a wide variety of propagandas constructed to serve 
different audiences. Propaganda, Ellul argues, can be used for ill or good, but is of itself 
neither good or bad. It simply exists as does any other manmade tool.  
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 Without providing a benchmark definition of propaganda, Ellul accepts the 
Institute for Propaganda Analysis’ “expression of opinion or action by individuals or 
groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions of other individuals or 
groups with reference to predetermined ends,” as “elementary,” but useful (Ellul, p. xi, 
IPA, p. 13). As such, many of Ellul’s observations are instructive for analyzing the 
Southern Poverty Law Center’s claims as works of propaganda. 
 Ellul contends that all propaganda is constructed to identify a perceived problem 
and to provide simplified solutions for that problem. Both the problem and the solution 
are comprised of half-truth, limited truth, and truth out of context: 
Thus, information not only provides the basis for propaganda, but gives 
propaganda the means to operate; for information actually generates the problems 
that propaganda exploits and for which it pretends to offer solutions. 
In fact, no propaganda can work until the moment when a set of facts has become 
a problem in the eyes of those who constitute public opinion. At the moment such 
problems begin to confront public opinion, propaganda on the part of a 
government, a party, or a man can begin to develop fully by magnifying that 
problem on the one hand and promising solutions for it on the other. 
But propaganda cannot easily create a political or economic problem out of 
nothing. There must be some reason in reality. The problem need not actually 
exist, but there must be a reason why it might exist (p. 14, emphases original). 
This paper has attempted to demonstrate the SPLC’s use of selected facts and half-truths 
to identify an alleged social problem, in this case that of hate groups, and to magnify the 
perceived threat out of all logical proportion. Do neo-Nazi and Ku Klux Klan groups 
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exist in America today? Without question and beyond all doubt. Do they pose a serious 
threat to a population of 325 million people? According to FBI statistics, the number of 
people injured by alleged hate groups over the past decade can be counted in the single 
digits. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in 2008 
alone more than 234,000 adults and children were injured, many seriously, from falling in 
their own bathrooms (CDC, 2011). Clearly, the threat of alleged hate groups to the 
general public has been exaggerated by the SPLC. As previously noted, the 
organization’s own Director of Intelligence, Mark Potok, has gone on record to say that 
“lone wolf” actors pose far more of a threat than any organized group (2008) and has 
publicly stated, ‘We are talking about a tiny number of Americans who are members of 
hate groups – I mean, infinitesimal” (Levinson, 1999). 
 Ellul explains why propaganda is often successful in the general public by 
exploiting people’s fears and anxieties: 
Propaganda cannot be gratuitous. The group must need something, and the 
propaganda must respond to that need. A frequent error on the part of the 
propagandist “pushing” something is the failure to take into account whether or 
not the propagandee needs it (p. 37). 
The secret of propaganda success or failure is this: Has it or has it not 
satisfied the unconscious need of the individual whom it addressed? No 
propaganda can have an effect unless it is needed, though the need may 
not be expressed as such but remain unconscious (p. 136). 
The SPLC’s message of glittering generalities built around “fighting hate” and “seeking 
justice” arguably have a better chance of resonating among its carefully selected audience 
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of Progressive donors, who may be more predisposed to a desire to contribute to the 
solution of perceived social problems, especially through cash donations, than their 
generally more fiscally conservative counterparts:  
Finally, the last condition for the development of propaganda is the prevalence of 
strong myths and ideologies in a society. At this point a few words are needed on 
the term ideology.  
To begin with, we subscribe to Raymond Aron’s statement that an 
ideology is any set of ideas accepted by individuals or peoples, without 
attention to their origin or value. But one must perhaps add, with Q. 
Wright, (1) an element of valuation (cherished ideas), (2) an element of 
actuality (ideas relating to the present), and (3) an element of belief 
(believed, rather than proved, ideas) (p. 116, emphasis original). 
As Mark Potok has repeatedly stated, the SPLC’s hate group designation has nothing to 
do with violence or criminality; “it’s strictly ideological.” 
Here Ellul offers an explanation of why so many academics, journalists, and 
researchers, all highly educated people whose entire careers are arguably built firmly 
upon foundations of critical thinking and ethical reasoning, are so often so willing to 
unquestioningly accept the SPLC’s data as factual and accurate: 
Naturally, the educated man does not believe in propaganda; he shrugs and is 
convinced that propaganda has no effect on him. This is, in fact, one of his great 
weaknesses, and propagandists are well aware that in order to reach someone, one 
must first convince him that propaganda is ineffectual and not very clever. 
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Because he is convinced of his own superiority, the intellectual is much more 
vulnerable than anybody else to this maneuver, even though basically a high 
intelligence, a broad culture, a constant exercise of the critical faculties, and full 
and objective information are still the best weapons against propaganda (p. 111, 
emphasis original). 
The SPLC’s hate group information meets all of the basic requirements of classical 
propaganda: it relies on half-truths and selected facts to create a social problem where, 
logically, the threats are minimal to the public at large. It plays upon the fears and 
prejudices of a carefully targeted audience, using false logic and guilt-by-association 
gimmicks to create unsubstantiated “would-could-might” existential threats. Ultimately, 
the SPLC offers hope to that audience that, with their continued crucial financial support, 
someone is out there who will “fight hate” and “seek justice” on their behalf. The SPLC 
creates the need and fills the need for a wide spectrum of readers, including researchers, 
academics and law makers. 
Conclusions 
As mentioned previously, a case can be made that there are actually two Southern 
Poverty Law Centers. The first continues to practice the unglamorous but entirely 
necessary “poverty law” work for which the organization was founded. By challenging 
the status quo in many state institutions, the SPLC has done great service toward 
protecting and enforcing the civil rights of many who have no other recourse. One rarely 
reads of these cases in the media, but the work is important and is to be commended.  
The other SPLC arguably describes a textbook example of “mission creep,” a 
gradual, often imperceptible shift in objectives that lead an organization away from its 
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original goals. For the SPLC, the early successes against the Ku Klux Klan in the 1980s 
brought unprecedented fame and fortune, or “More money than we could spend,” as 
Klanwatch Editor Randall Williams noted. Such success can bring about a natural desire 
for more, but as the relatively small pool of violent racist groups diminished, Morris Dees 
was forced to expand his definition of “hate group” to include non-violent groups and to 
include individuals and organizations whose ideologies were diametrically opposed to 
those of many of the SPLC’s progressive donors.  
From a rhetorical point of view, much of the information produced by the SPLC 
meets many of the most fundamental definitions of propaganda, described by Jowett 
(2012) as ‘attempts to move a recipient to a predetermined point of view by using simple 
images and slogans that truncate thought by plying prejudices and emotions” (p. 6). 
Jowett elaborates on this definition, noting that  
Propaganda thus runs the gamut from truth to deceptions. It is, at the same time, 
always value and ideology laden. The means may vary from a very mild slanting 
of information to outright deception, but the ends are always predetermined to 
favor the propagandist (p. 26).  
As with any such campaign, it is necessary to first dehumanize those people as “hate 
groups” and “far-right extremists,” or in Mark Potok’s words, “…just a bunch of 
sociopaths,” and to greatly exaggerate the threat they pose to society. Name calling is an 
ancient and highly successful rhetorical device, and in the case of this second SPLC, such 
fearmongering has proven to be highly lucrative. The greatest danger in this kind of 
vigilantism is that once a society allows a private, unregulated entity to arbitrarily 
designate “wrong thinkers,” it is only a matter of time before they come after you. 
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This paper has examined the claims made by the Southern Poverty Law Center, 
the hate group data and statistics the organization has produced over the past three 
decades, and the words and actions of its most visible actors, founder Morris Dees and 
Director of Intelligence Mark Potok. From the fundamental lack of a fixed, universal 
definition for “hate group,” to the incongruous interaction between Morris Dees and the 
Ku Klux Klan, as well as his inconsistent hiring and fundraising policies, to the numerous 
contradictory public statements made by Mark Potok, it is apparent that a demonstrable 
credibility gap exists between the SPLC’s carefully crafted reputation and the accuracy of 
its widely accepted claims.  
External stakeholders have their own reasons for accepting the SPLC’s unvetted 
data. The media, academic researchers and publishers, and law enforcement all have 
vested interests in perpetuating SPLC claims, and to greater and lesser extents. Those 
interests may be financial, as SPLC reports will often draw an audience and may be used 
to justify budgetary requests, though personal bias is often an ancillary motive. 
Ultimately, the interests of all three stakeholders, as well as that of the Southern Poverty 
Law Center, which generates tens of millions of dollars in donations each year, based 
largely on a fundraising program built squarely around its unsubstantiated hate group 
statistics, overlap, forming a self-feeding, self-perpetuating cycle to the benefit of all 
players.  
 At best, SPLC hate group data is unsubstantiated and clearly biased. At worst, the 
numbers are fabricated as part of a larger fundraising program that is based largely on 
fearmongering. As Mark Potok noted, the SPLC routinely “finds the 200 Nazis running 
around,” exaggerates the threat posed, if any, and “makes money off of it.” The ethical 
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challenges posed by the SPLC’s internal policies, such as claiming to be a civil rights 
organization but never hiring minorities to highly paid positions of authority, or by 
suggesting that the organization is in dire need of donations while it retains hundreds of 
millions of dollars in unrestricted funds, is also of great concern. Such direct mail 
persuasion gimmicks as the Wall of Tolerance and legal-but-dubious accounting 
practices, such as claiming “joint costs” to lower the apparent percentage of money spent 
on fundraising, or the use of telemarketers at the expense of tens of thousands of 
unsuspecting donors each year, all call the integrity of the SPLC into question. 
 Last, the sheer amount of money involved, from the tens of millions for the SPLC 
and related think tanks to the hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars in funding for 
the Department of Homeland Security, must be recognized as a significant possible 
influence on ignoring the accuracy of SPLC data. Professional researchers such as 
Chermak and Freilich are prepared to perform a complete about-face on their criticisms 
of SPLC data when there are millions of DHS dollars at stake. The information is still 
unreliable, they note, but at least it is consistent. 
Hate has always been and may always be part of the human condition. There is no 
denying that some people harbor racist, sexist and xenophobic attitudes and may be 
drawn to like-minded people in the same way as anyone else. Hate is largely based on 
fear, ignorance, and inequality. As with any highly emotional issue, there will always be 
those who will seek to exploit those feelings for gain. The “Hate Industry” Laird Wilcox 
wrote of is larger than ever and the Southern Poverty Law Center continues to play a 
major role in that industry. The organization’s hate group data are unverified, 
inconsistent, inaccurate and demonstrably biased. The data shows all of the hallmarks of 
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classic propaganda and the uses to which they have been put by some recall the darkest 
days of McCarthyism. 
As Jacques Ellul wrote, propagandists must create a need in the minds of their 
audience, feed it through half-truths and fearmongering, and ultimately supply a simple 
solution, if not to the problem itself, (which would put the propagandists out of business), 
then to the audiences’ question of “What can I do to help?” SPLC donors can “fight hate” 
and “seek justice” by simply writing a check. The SPLC even provides a self-addressed, 
postage-paid envelope. One could argue that the donors are being swindled, but from 
Ellul’s viewpoint, they are getting precisely what they paid for and feel they are getting 
good value for the dollar. 
And as Ellul posited, propaganda often works most effectively on those who 
arguably have the best tools with which to detect it. Propaganda, by design, circumvents 
logic and targets emotion. If any other advocacy group, such as the National Rifle 
Association, were to produce the exact same claims as the SPLC, word-for-word, it 
would be met with skepticism, at the very least, by the media, academia, and law makers. 
Marketing master, Morris Dees, has honed his organization’s reputation over the past 
forty-five years, creating a singularly successful brand name in the process, noting that 
We run our business like a business. Whether you’re selling cakes or causes, it’s 
all the same thing, the same basic process—just good, sound business practices 
(Egerton, p. 15). 
Unreliable information such as that produced by the Southern Poverty Law Center and 
other advocacy groups invariably taints research that is based largely upon it, and calls 
into question the ethical characters of those who produce and propagate it. Not only does 
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this flawed data lead to flawed research, that flawed research poses very real threats to 
American civil liberties. Laird Wilcox notes 
The SPLC has managed to engage police and government agencies to assist them, 
interfacing informational resources about personal circumstances, vulnerability, 
and any opportunities for prosecution. They have even counseled the military in 
stigmatization and defamation procedures. The rules and procedures that still 
pertain to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies don’t apply to the SPLC 
because they’re private, unsupervised, and unaccountable to anyone. 
Americans really need to ask themselves if they are willing to tolerate this 
kind of operation in a free society. Even if you agree with their stated 
goals, remember that sooner or later they might start looking at you or 
someone you love. Don’t imagine they can be contained by good will 
alone. What the Southern Poverty Law Center can get away with, 
eventually others can too (Wilcox, 2010). 
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